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Abstract
Realities and Perceptions: HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration and Implications for
Broader Neighborhood Revitalization
by
Carrie Ann Vanderford
Submitted to the MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in City Planning
HOPE VI was developed in 1992 as program to demolish and revitalize the nation's most severely
distressed public housing. One element of the HOPE VI program is to move low-income households out
of an environment of concentrated poverty and replace distressed public housing with a development that
includes a variety of incomes, where the number and density of households in poverty is decreased. This
policy of "poverty deconcentration" is now accepted and practiced by housing authorities as part of a
greater prescription for neighborhood revitalization. However, there is little evidence to prove the merits
of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration as a catalyst in neighborhood revitalization.
The focus of this thesis is to further define the link between policies of poverty deconcentration and
neighborhood revitalization while offering insight about the expected long-term benefit of this policy for
future HOPE VI planning. The two housing authorities responsible for developing Mandela Gateway in
Oakland, California and Posadas Sentinel in Tucson, Arizona aimed to achieve the HOPE VI mandate of
poverty deconcentration through two strategies. For this thesis, these strategies are categorized as
development-based poverty dilution and neighborhood-based poverty dispersal, respectively.
This thesis relies upon interviews with key informants, document review, and some analysis of land use
patterns in neighborhoods surrounding HOPE VI developments to investigate causality between two
methods of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration and broader neighborhood revitalization. The main
conclusions of this thesis are drawn from the interaction between the policies and practices of the local
public housing authority and other public and private investors in the broader neighborhood.
Overall, this thesis finds that HOPE VI poverty deconcentration strategies alone are not enough to affect
broader neighborhood revitalization, but are a critical element in changing the perception of public and
private investors as they contemplate investment around the development. In both cases the poverty
deconcentration strategy was implemented in a way that harnessed existing market forces for
neighborhood revitalization. This thesis concludes with a discussion of the best practices to advance the
critical goals of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration and offers anagenda for further research.
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Chapter One: Introduction, Literature Review, and Methodology
The Problem
Two critical elements of the HOPE VI program are the movement of low-income households
from an environment of concentrated poverty and the replacement of distressed public housing
with a development that includes a variety of incomes, where the number and density of
households in poverty is decreased. This policy of "poverty deconcentration" is now accepted
and practiced by housing authorities as part of a greater prescription for neighborhood
revitalization. However, the assumptions behind this policy have not been fully tested. There is
little evidence to prove the merit of poverty deconcentration as a catalyst in neighborhood
revitalization.
The focus of this thesis is to further define the link between the policy of poverty
deconcentration and neighborhood revitalization while offering insight about the expected long-
term benefit of this policy for future HOPE VI planning. This thesis seeks to challenge the
theory-based assumption and practice of public housing authorities that getting rid of poor
people in public housing will improve the neighborhood. The research question to be answered
in this thesis is whether and how HOPE VI policies of poverty deconcentration have succeeded
as a strategy for broader neighborhood revitalization. If, in fact, poverty concentration in
severely distressed public housing agitates social characteristics that cause neighborhood
detriment and deterioration, then poverty deconcentration at HOPE VI developments should
produce a more desirable, more revitalized neighborhood.
In this thesis the type of poverty concentration is narrowly defined as the concentration of very
low income households that live in severely distressed public housing, as they have no other
choice. These residents live in the proverbial "housing of last resort" and are one step away from
homelessness. Social characteristics associated with this kind of concentrated poverty include
high unemployment, single female headed households, low education levels, and poor physical
health.
In two cases, interesting conclusions are drawn about the function of two poverty
deconcentration strategies to change public and private investors' political and social perceptions
about the impact of public housing in the broader neighborhood. The political and social
acceptance of HOPE VI developments by these actors demonstrates that deconcentration of
poverty is a critical element in changing the stigma and blight perceived in the larger community
by public and private investors in the broader neighborhood, although it is too soon in the
lifecycle of the two present HOPE VI developments to tell the depth of this impact.
Causality of the relationship between HOPE VI poverty deconcentration and implications for
broader neighborhood revitalization is tested through interviews of public and private investors
and entities that have an interest in the revitalization of the neighborhood surrounding the HOPE
VI development. Quantitative data alone are not enough of a description to get at the
motivations and results of public and private investment in HOPE VI neighborhoods where there
has been poverty deconcentration.
The Cases
This thesis considers the relationship of poverty concentration and neighborhood revitalization
from the perspective of housing authority administrators and related public and private
neighborhood stakeholders in two cases. These two perspectives offer evidence of the
advantages and shortcoming of poverty deconcentration as a strategy for broader neighborhood
revitalization and shed light on the importance of neighborhood trends, beyond the HOPE VI
effort, that play into actors' investment decisions. The residents' perspective was not presented
because it lies outside of the scope of information related to the original research question.
However, the resident character and income mix in the severely distressed public housing and its
related HOPE VI development are compared to one another to illustrate the relationship between
who is served and the type of poverty deconcentration implemented in each case. It is clear from
this comparison that an investigation about HOPE VI poverty deconcentration should not and
cannot be considered separately from questions of who is served by HOPE VI.
Within the HOPE VI program, there are two widely-practiced methods available to housing
authorities to deconcentrate the very low income households (specifically public housing-eligible
households), although most HOPE VI grantees implement one of several variations on these two
strategies.1 One method is to relocate the poor from the original public housing and disperse
them throughout the city or region by placing them in other public housing or by giving them a
Section 8 rental voucher to find housing on the private market. However, this strategy often does
not result in a truly scattered dispersal, as public housing residents are often placed in other low-
income neighborhoods finding themselves once again in an island of poverty. The other widely-
practiced poverty deconcentration method is to dilute the concentration of poverty onsite by
adding higher income households to the same development. This dilution method is usually
accompanied by a reduction in the number of original public housing units onsite.
Posadas Sentinel in Tucson, Arizona, is a case where the HUD policy of poverty
deconcentration was achieved by moving public housing residents away from the HOPE VI site
and adding households with higher incomes to the HOPE VI development. For this thesis, this
strategy will be referred to as "neighborhood-based dispersal."
The revitalization of Connie Chambers, as the former public housing was called, was planned to
be a catalyst for public and private investment in the broader Barrio Santa Rosa. There were 200
units of traditional public housing at Connie Chambers available to households earning 50% of
median area income or less. The City of Tucson demolished all 200 of the former public housing
units and built back 120 duplexes and rowhouses in a mixed-income community. 60 of these
units remain public housing and 60 units are affordable to households that earn up to 80% of the
area median income. The City of Tucson acquired 140 scattered site units throughout Tucson
intended for relocated households from Connie Chambers. However, according to the
Community Services division of the City of Tucson, only 23 of the original 200 Connie
Chambers households took one of these newly acquired units. Additionally, 10 new three-
bedroom homes were constructed for homeownership, adjacent to Posadas Sentinel.2
Posadas Sentinel was developed under the 1996 HOPE VI revitalization grant and reflects a
change in HUD direction from a policy that was mostly concerned with issues of resident and
housing authority isolation to a program that now mandates neighborhood-wide transformation.
' For a full listing of these strategies from FY 1997-2004, see Appendix A on page 111.
2 See map of the location of the scattered site housing and the ten units of homeownership at Exhibits I and 2 on
pages 34 and 35.
Alternatively, Mandela Gateway in Oakland, California, is a HOPE VI development where
the policy of poverty deconcentration was achieved by maintaining the same amount of public
housing on the site that existed before the HOPE VI revitalization grant and adding units to
increase the number of households onsite that earn between 50-80% of the area annual median
income. The Oakland Housing Authority pursued this strategy of "development-based poverty
dilution" because the agency was able to acquire two parcels of land for the HOPE VI
development that would allow the public housing units to be distributed over a larger area as
additional units for households up to 60% of annual median income were added to the
development. Further, one for one replacement of public housing units is a required operational
standard for the Oakland Housing Authority and is mandated by the authority's Board of
Commissioners, which is not often a common constraint among US housing authorities.3
Mandela Gateway was developed under a 1999 HOPE VI Revitalization grant that takes
seriously the notion of neighborhood revitalization through policies of public housing poverty
deconcentration.
The two cases, Mandela Gateway and Posadas Sentinel, are important because they demonstrate
two exemplary fixtures in a continuum of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration strategies. In both
cases, the density of public housing households has been reduced. The degree to which this
poverty deconcentration has translated into greater neighborhood revitalization is revealed as
these two developments are situated in a larger spectrum of historical, economic, and political
trends that define the co-evolution of both the development and its broader neighborhood.
Background
The Evolution of HOPE VI and Poverty Deconcentration Policy
HOPE VI is a Federal program that was developed to salvage and revitalize America's worst
public housing. Begun in 1992, the HOPE VI redevelopment program is often characterized by
large-scale physical demolition and rebuilding, the deconcentration of poverty, the introduction
of mixed-income populations to the former public housing, the inclusion of homeownership
units, reduced isolation of the project and its residents from the broader neighborhood, and
increased public amenities and supportive services for residents. Since its inception, the program
3 Of the seven members of the OHA Board of Commissioners, two are public housing residents.
has evolved in its goals of physical revitalization of public housing to a program that now aims
to catalyze broader neighborhood revitalization, beyond the physical housing.
Ostensibly, the planning policies of HOPE VI have always indicated funding prioritization of
developments that spur positive revitalization spillover effects into the broader neighborhood.
However, only since 1996 have these priorities of neighborhood revitalization have been
expressly included in the annual HOPE VI Demolition and Revitalization Notice of Funds
Available. From 1993 to 1996, the HOPE VI program expanded into a market-driven
mechanism for broader neighborhood transformation (Zhang 2004).
Guiding the Federal HOPE VI program poverty deconcentration element was the Final Report of
The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH), which was
established in 1989 by Congress. The task of this Commission was to develop criteria and
identify the nation's most severely distressed public housing and develop an action plan to
remedy the problem. When the Commission published its results in its 1992 Final Report, the
group found that that 86,000 public housing units were severely distressed. As an indirect result
of these findings and the subsequent report, Congress created the HOPE VI program, which has
been reauthorized to the end of FY 2006.
The Commission's Final Report describes severely distressed housing both in terms of physical
and social deterioration. The report states, "Severely distressed public housing is not simply a
matter of deteriorating physical conditions; it is more importantly one of a deteriorating -
severely distressed - population in need of a multitude of services and immediate attention"
(NCSDPH 1992: 46). The report further states, "It appears that public housing communities are
less difficult to manage and that it is easier to provide greater benefits to all residents if there is a
mix of incomes to include a greater number of households with members who are employed"
(NCSDPH 1992: 69). The Commission found that that the conditions of poverty, physical
deterioration, and crime in neighborhoods surrounding severely distressed public housing
contributed to the conditions of severe distress (NCSDPH 1992:38).
As HOPE VI policy was developed, HUD adopted the recommendation from the 1989
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing that the over concentration of households in
poverty was a major contributor to the high levels of social problems in distressed public housing
(Popkin 2004). This assumption led Federal housing policy makers to develop public housing
policy that included deconcentration strategies which moved poor, public housing residents to
better neighborhoods and replaced distressed public housing with mixed-income communities
(Popkin 2004).
More recently, the conventional quantitative wisdom finds that crime rates have declined and
lending for residential and small businesses has increased in neighborhoods surrounding HOPE
VI developments. Widely accepted among the scholars of public housing is the assumption that
the presence of higher incomes in publicly subsidized housing can boost the purchasing power of
residents in the development as a whole and create more demand for goods and services, which
can help increase the neighborhood's profit potential and attract potential investors (Zielenbach
2002). While inconclusive, recent research suggests that HOPE VI is part of a broader collection
of revitalizing activity in the neighborhood (Zielenbach 2002, Turbov and Piper 2005).
A snapshot of HOPE VI program history illuminates the importance of poverty deconcentration
and implications for broader neighborhood revitalization since the program's inception in 1992.
In his 1999 article "The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing: Early Results from HOPE
VI Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Antonio", author Jerry Salama lists six major goals of
the HOPE VI program based on legislative history and HUD's annual Notices of Funding
Availability (Salama 1999). These include:
1. Lessening the concentration of very poor residents and creating mixed-income communities,
including off-site replacement housing serving diverse households
2. Creating partnerships to leverage additional resources
3. Implementing cost-effective plans
4. Providing opportunities for family economic self-sufficiency, particularly for persons enrolled
in welfare-to-work programs
5. Building sustainable communities that include a physical design that blends into and enriches
the urban landscape
6. Ensuring that affected residents and members of the communities have full and meaningful
involvement in the planning and implementation of the revitalization effort
A search on the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development website turns up these
"specific elements of public housing transformation that have proven key to HOPE VI" 4:
1. Changing the physical shape of public housing
2. Establishing positive incentives for resident self-sufficiency and comprehensive services
that empower residents
3. Lessening concentrations of poverty by placing public housing in nonpoverty
neighborhoods and promoting mixed-income communities
4. Forging partnerships with other agencies, local governments, nonprofit organizations, and
private businesses to leverage support and resources
Other important policies to transform public housing through the HOPE VI program have
included (List adapted and augmented from Salama 1999 and Popkin 2004):
1. The elimination of Federal preferences for admission of very low income households to public
housing, which allowed local public housing authorities to establish their own
preferences for public housing admission. This law provided the regulations to allow
public housing authorities to development housing that includes a mix of household
incomes, up to 100% of area median income.
2. The elimination of the one-for-one replacement requirement for demolished public housing
units.
3. The 1996 NOFA encouraged HOPE VI applicants to use mixed-financing strategies to
combine public housing units with units funded by the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(for households up to 80% of area median income).
4. HOPE VI funds and operating subsidies were authorized for use by private entities other
than the Public Housing Authority. The idea here was to increase private investment is
severely distressed neighborhoods while introducing a mix of incomes to the public
4 Search at www.hud.gov, keyword: HOPE VI. May 2, 2006.
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/index.cfm
housing development (Diaz 1994a, 1994b; HUD 1996, 1996b;Reardon 1994 in Salama
1999, Popkin et al. 2004).
5. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) was passed and
required that 40 percent of a housing authority's units made available in a year must be
occupied by families with incomes at or below 30 percent of the area median income.
This legislation requires public housing authorities to bring 'higher-income tenants into
lower-income projects and lower-income tenants into higher-income projects.'
Specific to the perceived broader neighborhood impacts of HOPE VI development, HUD now
(since 1996) places particular policy emphasis on the level of involvement by local public,
private, and nonprofit entities and community representatives in the preparation of the HOPE VI
application. HUD encourages public housing authorities to create partnerships with other
entities for the purpose of developing housing that fits well with the broader community and is
seen as an integral part of it. Also considered is the extent to which the applicant housing
authority coordinates HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization plans with other revitalization
efforts in the broader community. HUD favors HOPE VI applicants that develop partnerships in
the community to position redeveloped public housing as a catalyst for neighborhood
revitalization.
Most relevant to the research presented in this thesis is the HOPE VI program emphasis on the
extent to which the applicant proposes to "place public housing in nonpoverty neighborhoods or
promote mixed-income communities where public housing once stood alone, thereby
contributing to the positive change for residents of the development and the surrounding
community" (HUD 1996: 38028). The two cases presented in this thesis, Tucson's Posadas
Sentinel and Oakland's Mandela Gateway, aimed to achieve the element of poverty
deconcentration through neighborhood-based dispersion and onsite, development-based poverty
dilution strategies, respectively.
Historical Trends of HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration
It is important to lodge the two types of poverty deconcentration studied in this thesis in a
broader spectrum of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration strategies since 1996. By placing the
two present strategies in a larger poverty deconcentration spectrum, it becomes clear that these
two cases are exemplary of many other poverty deconcentration approaches across the country
and across several years. When evaluating the poverty deconcentration strategies of all HOPE
VI funded plans from 1997-2004, several trends emerge.5
First, in virtually all of the redevelopment plans the total number of public housing units, either
onsite or offsite, is significantly reduced. Second, the households with higher annual incomes
were often introduced to sites where there was a reduction in the number of public housing units.
Third, many housing authorities planned to introduce homeownership in the HOPE VI
development to create an influence of pride and ownership. Fourth, in very few instances the
original number of public housing units were preserved onsite, but units designated to
households up to 80% of the area median income were introduced to the development.
Generally, the development would include 1/3 public housing and 2/3 homeownership and rental
units for households up to 80% of AMI and some market rate rental and homeownership
opportunities. Fifth, rather than preserving the public housing as rental units, often the public
housing units were converted to lease-to-own units for households that would be eligible for
public housing (household income at or below 50% AMI). Sixth, often housing authorities
would develop two sites with public housing units split between both sites and situated among
units for households at higher incomes. Seventh, there would be significantly fewer total units in
the development than the previous public housing and significantly less public housing as part of
the total. So, this was fewer overall units and significantly fewer public housing units than were
on the site previously. Eighth, all of the units, both public housing and units for higher income
households, were dispersed in a neighborhood or larger community while the total number of
public housing replacement units was severely reduced.
5 See Appendix A for a full recount of these trends on page 111.
The Causes of Poverty Concentration
Before one evaluates the design and value of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration policies, it is
critical to understand the theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings that define these
policies. Several theories have emerged to explain the manifestation of concentrated poverty in
areas where severely distressed housing is located, specifically in America's inner-cities. These
theories, in part, have shaped the Federal mandate of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration.
1. The Outmigration of the Middle Class: William Julius Wilson argues in The Truly
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy (1987), that the
outmigration of higher income families from the inner cities makes the amenities of the
inner city such as churches, commercial and retail uses, schools, and recreational
facilities less viable thus leaving behind low-income households in a concentration of
poverty as these households are unable to leave the inner city to find other opportunities
for economic self-sufficiency. As joblessness and poverty concentrates in one area,
Wilson argues that an isolated underclass emerges, distant from public and private
amenities and separate from households with higher incomes. Wilson further argues that
to reduce this concentration of poverty, neighborhoods must be infused with higher
income households to increase public and private amenities which benefit low income
households. Wilson makes a structuralist argument that the inner city urban underclass
arose from a "complex interplay of civil rights policy, economic restructuring, and a
historical legacy of discrimination" (Wilson 1987 quoted in Massey and Denton 1993).
Brophy and Smith (1997) find that the proximity of higher income households will
"reduce the social pathology caused by the concentration" of poverty suffered by public
housing residents. Themes of physical, economic, social, and political isolation are
central to these two theories of poverty concentration, evident in both the Posadas
Sentinel and Mandela Gateway cases.
2. The "Spatial Mismatch Theory", documented most recently by Kasarda (1990) and
Ihlandfedlt and Sjoquist (1998) and related in Goetz (2003), explains concentrated
poverty as low income households are isolated in economically distressed areas away
from the dynamic growth centers of the economy that are often located in suburban and
non-metropolitan areas, distant from America's inner cities. This theory is especially
relevant in the Mandela Gateway case, as West Oakland (the location of Mandela
Gateway) has been isolated for decades from the mainstream Bay Area economy.
However, this is beginning to change with the BART Station and the removal of the
Cypress Freeway following the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989.
3. Race and Poverty Concentration: Massey and Denton (1993) and Jargowsky (1997)
add the element of race to explanations of poverty concentration. They find that
households of color are more likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty and
experience the pathologies associated with this concentration of poverty than non-colored
households.
In Massey and Denton's American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the
Underclass (1993), the authors argue that residential segregation has created a
structurally imbedded set of attitudes and behaviors that has caused a "culture of
segregation" to flourish. They hold that this residential segregation has created an
urban underclass that "devalues work, schooling, and marriage and that stresses
attitudes and behaviors that are antithetical and often hostile to success in the larger
economy." They contend that this residential segregation has created isolated areas of
concentrated black poverty.
Jarkowsky's Poverty and Place (1997) provides a comprehensive look at neighborhood-
level poverty in U.S. metropolitan areas between 1970 and 1990. His empirical research
indicates several economic and social trends in areas of concentrated poverty. He finds
that the drivers of increased neighborhood-level poverty are rooted in "structural changes
in the economy have worked to the disadvantage of those with lower education and job
skills, resulting in slow or negative wage growth for such persons" (Jarkowsky 1997:
144). He also finds that the economic segregation within a minority group, (the flight
of the black middle class from areas of poverty concentration) has contributed to these
isolated pockets of inner city poverty. He writes, "Taken together, the macrostructural
explanations of neighborhood poverty - which hold that ghettos and barrios are the
result of larger, metropolitan-level processes - can explain about four fifths of the
variance in ghetto poverty" (Jarkowsky 1997: 144).
Understanding Neighborhood Decline and Revitalization: Definitions
A framework for this particular interaction and causal relationship between neighborhood
decline and the presence of public housing has been argued by several practitioners and theorists.
It is important to understand what is meant by "the neighborhood" when evaluating implications
of public housing and poverty concentration in the decline and revitalization of these
neighborhoods. For this thesis, I physically defined the studied neighborhoods by using the
planning boundaries used in planning the HOPE VI development in each case. There are
exhibits placed in each case's specific chapter to describe these planning areas. At both Posadas
Sentinel and Mandela Gateway, the neighborhood surrounding the HOPE VI site was
considered in the in the housing authorities' plans for the revitalized housing.
To begin to define neighborhood I asked, "What does a neighborhood mean to its residents and
the users of its supported public and private amenities?" I wondered, "Is it that neighborhoods
give residents and those outside of the neighborhood cues about safety, economy, accessibility,
and health?" I found that often there are visual, social, or even emotional indicators that tell one
when one enters a particular neighborhood and goes to the next. The presence of large blocks of
severely distressed public housing plays a significant role in the perception of a neighborhood
for both public housing residents and non-residents. Simply put, the form of housing in
neighborhoods significantly contributes to our awareness about a place. In the two cases
presented in this thesis, the perception and awareness of severely distressed public housing and
its HOPE VI replacement have made a significant visual impact that served to create a tangible
identity of the two studied neighborhoods. Before HOPE VI, these two neighborhoods had a
veritable public housing identity.
For this thesis, a definition by Norm Krumholz found in his book with Dennis Keating, and
Philip Star, Revitalizing Urban Neighborhoods was used to define "the neighborhood."
Krumholz writes, "Neighborhoods are more than places to live; they are interactive components
of a larger urban system, each affecting the other over time and space."
This definition is useful because it describes a neighborhood as an urban form that is part of a
larger network of social, physical, and economic cause and effect. In this thesis, the severely
distressed public housing and its HOPE VI replacement are described as part of this larger
network of underlying trends. Under this definition of neighborhood, it follows that a
concentration of poverty that causes disinvestment in one neighborhood will have effects on the
larger community and perhaps even the larger region of neighborhoods in terms of who lives
where, which amenities are available in which neighborhoods, and perception of place.
In the book's preface Krumholz writes, "Neighborhood initiatives are both a strategy and a
metaphor for how America deals with its most significant urban problems." According to the
authors, neighborhoods are both a palate for change and a unit of disintegration. The authors are
careful to acknowledge the work of individual leaders and neighborhood organizations as major
institutions of change and revitalization in neighborhoods. This rings true in both cases
presented in this thesis, as these neighborhood institutions had a major role in the development
of the type and scale of poverty deconcentration at Posadas Sentinel and Mandela Gateway.
Although not particularly specific to the results and design of HOPE VI, the authors cite a major
role for the Federal government in determining the fate of urban neighborhoods. The book
states, "For the past several decades, it as been the Federal government that has played a critical
role in determining the fate of urban neighborhoods, both positively and negatively." The
authors find the provision of housing, both public and private, is an important part of reclaiming
neighborhoods. Federal support, such as the HOPE VI program, to is key to this housing
development (Krumholz 1999: 238).
For Krumholz and William Julius Wilson, it appears that a key issue to neighborhood
revitalization is the return of the middle class to America's inner city neighborhoods of
concentrated poverty. Building on William Julius Wilson's description of the origins of inner-
city concentrations of poverty, Krumholz, et al. describe a trend of isolation and neglect in poor
neighborhoods. They note, "As resources are directed to downtown redevelopment,
neighborhoods have often been neglected. Trickle-down economics has not worked to benefit
the poor residents of distressed neighborhoods, who have not usually benefited directly in the
form of jobs through downtown redevelopment." Here, Krumholz is acknowledging that a mix
of incomes and perhaps even a gentrification of a neighborhood is one of the key ways in which
a neighborhood becomes revitalized.
In his 1981 book, Neighborhoods and Urban Development Anthony Downs describes the
revitalization of urban neighborhoods in terms of whether the average cost of occupying housing
in the neighborhood has increased or decreased. This metric was used for this thesis. He
believes that one can tell that a neighborhood is revitalizing if property taxes are rising. Downs
also gives a list of indicators that indicate future neighborhood decline including land use
changes, the entry of low-income households, lower income occupancy, declining public
services and the presence of obsolete structures (Downs 1981: 18-19).
The perception of how the neighborhood "looks and feels" to residents and outside private and
public investors is critical to Downs's theory. This issue is particularly important to the two
poverty deconcentration strategies used by the Tucson Community Services Department and the
Oakland Housing Authority. Downs writes, "Each household in a neighborhood is affected by
the surrounding households and by the expectations it has about these households"(Downs 1981:
16). He also finds that there are certain groups that are negatively affected by revitalization as
residents on the lower end of the income spectrum are often displaced through market forces as
their property values increase and they are unable to pay taxes and remain in the neighborhood.
He writes, "The major costs of revitalization fall upon households who would not otherwise have
moved but are displaced by rising occupancy costs they cannot afford to pay." This issue of
gentrification and displacement is central to the two cases presented in this thesis, as both HOPE
VI developments are situated in neighborhoods where these trends are present.
The Relevance of this Thesis for the Intended Audience
The analysis and conclusions presented in this thesis bear significant relevance to policy makers
at the Federal level and HOPE VI administrators at the local level. As HUD continues to require
poverty deconcentration in public housing revitalization programs, it is useful for the Federal
agency to understand the implications of this policy on the HOPE VI microneighborhood level,
as demonstrated in the two cases presented in this thesis.
There is wide variance in Housing Authorities' approach to poverty deconcentration. Some have
been more successful than others in preserving public housing units in HOPE VI developments
while addressing the mandate of poverty deconcentration. This thesis presents two cases that
have successfully preserved all of the original number of public housing units while
deconcentrating poverty and revitalizing the broader neighborhood. However, while all the
public housing units were replaced either offsite or onsite, a very low percentage of the original
families of the replaced public housing development returned to these units. This begs the
question, "For whom are these public housing units replaced?"
If one measure of HOPE VI is its ability to revitalize the broader neighborhood, then these two
cases provide valuable insight about the ability of poverty deconcentration measures to
contribute to this revitalization. In essence, this thesis offers Federal and local HOPE VI actors a
framework of analysis to inform their policy decisions about how and to what scale poverty
deconcentration policies will be used to create positive neighborhood revitalization effects in
HOPE VI housing and the broader neighborhood. This thesis is an alert to public housing policy
makers and practitioners that the strategy of poverty deconcentration must be carefully examined
as part of a HOPE VI neighborhood revitalization strategy.
This thesis is important given that the HOPE VI program is the only available Federally
sponsored measure to revitalize public housing that reaches the most difficult to house families
and individuals, although it is unclear who among these difficult to house really benefits from
these HOPE VI revitalizations. As the demand for this type of housing continues to escalate as
the HOPE VI budget is cut annually (and is up for reauthorization in FY2007), it is more
important than ever to demonstrate the impact of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration strategies
for broader neighborhood revitalization to help make the case for reauthorization of the HOPE
VI program or the initiation of a new program to replace America's most severely distressed
public housing and transform surrounding neighborhoods. In response to this ongoing critical
shortage of public housing revitalization funding, this thesis serves as a coupling of cases that
offer an empirical investigation to the outcomes of the HOPE VI program as it has been
positioned to revitalize neighborhoods through a strategy of poverty deconcentration.
This thesis is relevant because it offers some conclusions about the HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration and broader neighborhood revitalization. Previous research on this topic has not
yet illuminated how changes in the microcommunity of a publicly subsidized housing project
might impact more widely the high-poverty neighborhoods in which they are located through
methods of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration. This thesis provides insight into to the
perceptions of public and private developers that wish to develop around these HOPE VI
projects, thereby offering more evidence about the implications of poverty deconcentration for
broader neighborhood revitalization. This research presents a mostly untold story that relates the
question of who is served by HOPE VI with the success of the neighborhood revitalization
catalyzed by the HOPE VI development.
As the two cases demonstrate, there is a key set of factors that make newly developed HOPE VI
sites a sustainable and preferable alternative to the public housing that it replaced. While a
strategy of poverty deconcentration makes pro-forma numbers work and perhaps satisfies the
interests of public and private investors, is this strategy truly solving any of the long-term issues
associated with neighborhood decline? Does the strategy of poverty deconcentration address the
structural causes of neighborhood decline?
Literature Review
The literature review below describes key studies and current literature that have come close to
answering my research questions around the implication of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration
strategies for broader neighborhood development. Taken together, this review indicates that
there is a research gap on the focused evaluation of the causality of HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration strategies and related implications for broader neighborhood revitalization.
The Literature on HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration
There is very little literature about the deconcentration of poverty, specific to HOPE VI
development. The most prominent scholar of Federal housing-related poverty deconcentration
strategies is Edward Goetz, of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the
University of Minnesota. His recent book Clearing the Way: Deconcentrating the Poor in Urban
America describes the history of Federal housing policy focused on the dispersal of subsidized
families. Goetz presents a review of two generations of housing dispersal policy which laid the
historical groundwork for HOPE VI policies of poverty deconcentration. He categorizes the first
generation of dispersal policy as the time between the late 1960s through the mid 1970s, as part
of the fair housing movement around issues of "racial discrimination and suburban exclusionism
in housing (3)." The second generation of dispersion policy starts in the early 1990s, and is
aimed at deconcentration poverty in urban areas. At this time, Congress began to associate the
failures of public housing with the occurrence of concentrated poverty in these areas. He
distinguishes these dispersal programs as either unit-based or tenant- based and how (or whether)
the housing subsidy is targeted. He categorizes the HOPE VI program as a Unit-Based approach
targeted at neighborhoods of concentrated poverty.
Although only briefly focused on the HOPE VI poverty deconcentration policies, Goetz contends
that "the largest single programmatic effort at deconcentrating poverty has been the HOPE VI
program." However, he notes that there has been very little research of the question of HOPE VI
poverty deconcentration policy impact on communities of concentrated poverty (2003: 69).
Goetz defines HOPE VI poverty deconcentration as a triple-deconcentration as there are "fewer
public housing units onsite, they are mixed with more nonpublic housing units, and the income
mix within public housing is greater than before (11)." Just as the housing authorities at Tucson
and Oakland argue, Goetz finds that, "Neighborhoods of highly concentrated poverty produce
negative community-level effects for cities" (29).
Goetz relates two main benefits to poverty deconcentration. Firstly, he finds that social problems
decrease in previously concentrated neighborhoods. Secondly, dispersed low-income families
experience improved living conditions and life opportunities (67). Both of these benefits were
tested in at Posadas Sentinel and Mandela Gateway. My results show that residents in Posadas
and Mandela are living in a place with fewer of the social pathologies that dominated the public
housing that was replaced and the residents of these two developments are seemingly
experiencing improved living conditions and life opportunities. However, the resident character
of these developments is very different that the resident character of the former public housing.
That is, the public housing residents of the HOPE VI developments in both cases are generally
more predetermined to be striving for self-sufficiency and a higher quality of life, as
management is tougher and screening policies are more detailed than at the former public
housing. Goetz does not sufficiently account for this difference in residential character in his
analysis.
Earlier, Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997) speak indirectly to Goetz's contention of the
community-level effects of concentrated poverty in an important Cityscape article entitled
"Mixed-Income Housing: Unanswered Questions." They found that while neighborhoods with
a high poverty concentration tend to have higher levels of social problems than less poor
neighborhoods, the link between neighborhood or project characteristics and behavioral and
social outcomes is unclear. Similar to the questions that remain from this thesis research,
Schwartz and Tajbakhsh ask, "What is it about socioeconomically heterogeneous neighborhoods
and housing developments that leads to better outcomes? Is it the presence of role models or
institutions providing social capital and job contacts?" They offer a research agenda that I have
tried to pursue in this thesis. They propose, "Research on mixed-income housing is necessary to
determine the extent to which reducing the concentration of poverty can also reverse the social
problems connected to poverty."
Jill Khadduri (2001) lays out three meanings of poverty deconcentration in Federal housing
policy. These include:
1) "Creating income diversity within public housing developments that continue to be
owned and operated by public housing authorities under the rules of the public housing
program."
2) "Creating income diversity in new or redeveloped housing projects, including former
public housing projects redeveloped under the HOPE VI program."
3) "Encouraging the use of tenant-based housing vouchers for families to locate in
neighborhoods that will improve the life opportunities of family members."
Particular to the research presented in this thesis is Khadduri's finding that "the benefits of an
economically diverse community (mixed-income) will be constrained or enhanced by the
character of the surrounding area." At both Posadas and Mandela, I found that the
redevelopment of the former severely distressed public housing was only part of a larger
continuum of blight and future revitalization for the broader neighborhood. However, in my
cases it is evident that the revitalization of the former public housing was a significant element in
the character of the surrounding area, which was enhanced by the new HOPE VI mixed-income
developments.
Finally, much research has been conducted about the question of "Who is served?" in mixed-
income developments, where poverty has been deconcentrated from previous levels. Reported in
False Hope: A Critical Assessment of HOPE VI, researchers found that only 11.4 percent of
former public housing residents have returned to HOPE VI sites. This is confirmed in both of
the cases presented here as only 13 out of the original 46 Westwood Gardens public housing
households returned to Mandela Gateway and only 17 of the original 200 households at Connie
Chambers returned to Posadas Sentinel. The population that is served in the resulting HOPE VI
development is vastly different than the population served at public housing that it replaced.
This "creaming" effect through detailed screening caused many of the former public housing
tenants to be ineligible for the new HOPE VI housing. A more detailed screening process was
central to the poverty deconcentration strategies at Mandela Gateway and Posadas Sentinel
presented in this thesis. Not only was there a deconcentration of very low income households,
but the very low income households that were allowed to come back to the HOPE VI
development were significantly different in terms of economic mobility and self-sufficiency than
the public housing households in the former severely distressed public housing.
In his paper, Mixed-Income Housing Developments: Promise and Reality (2002), Alistair Smith
finds that a mixed income development, such as a HOPE VI development, may have a role in
creating a healthy neighborhood where households may be able to break the cycle of poverty, but
suggests that other housing strategies may prove to be more effective in achieving overall
neighborhood health. Smith questions whether property managers of these mixed-income
developments apply stricter screening and management practices, thereby "curtailing the
incidence of negative social behavior" that might have been caused by very low income
households in areas of concentrated poverty (2). Smith echoes the questions that I had for
Posadas and Mandela. Was it the poverty deconcentration or the difference in resident character
that served to revitalize the broader HOPE VI neighborhood?
Brophy and Smith (1997) found that income mixing alone is not enough to help low income
residents achieve upward economic and social mobility. They conclude that the biggest
challenge to mixed income housing is "income integration in neighborhood settings where
property management is not able to set behavioral norms." Again, this study highlights the
importance of property management in housing developments where poverty has been
deconcentrated and tenants with higher household incomes are introduced. In short, Brophy and
Smith find that deconcentration and income mixing is not an end to affect broader neighborhood
revitalization.
Rosenbaum, et. al. (1998) studied Lake Parc Place in Chicago and offer some answers to this
question of how mixed-income developments would serve low income tenants. The authors
studied Lake Parc Place to find out the outcome and feasibility of public housing residents living
in the same development as middle-income tenants. Lake Parc Place was originally a severely
distressed project comprised totally of low-income residents. Its revitalization program included
a mixed-income with half the units for non-public housing residents and half for low-income
residents. The authors found that the middle-income tenants insisted that rules and regulations
be strictly enforced and the safety at Lake Parc Place was improved. The authors did not
conclude whether the improved safety at the development would lead to better economic and
social outcomes for the public housing - low income residents.
Important Literature about HOPE VI Development and Broader Neighborhood Revitalization
Two other recent papers have considered issues related to the topic of HOPE VI as a catalyst for
broader neighborhood transformation. Overall, there is an obvious gap in the literature that
addresses the intersection of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration policies and broader
neighborhood revitalization.
Similar to my conclusions, Turbov and Piper's HOPE VI and Mixed-Finance Redevelopments: A
Catalystfor Neighborhood Renewal (2005) addresses the force of the market as a determinant of
whether the HOPE VI development will be able to catalyze broader neighborhood revitalization.
The paper places four HOPE VI developments in a larger continuum of investment or
disinvestment in the surrounding neighborhood. This was described especially well in the St.
Louis case, where "public housing redevelopments respond to marketplace realities within a
holistic neighborhood plan attract and boost credibility with private sector partners, investors,
and philanthropies, facilitating the leveraging of public dollars."
The aim of Turbov and Piper's paper was to evaluate the effectiveness of the HOPE VI program
to "jump-start wholesale neighborhood improvements, with HOPE VI funding as the catalyst for
attracting other capital to financing large-scale neighborhood redevelopment" (v). The paper
looked at four HOPE VI redevelopment projects in Atlanta, Louisville, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis.
Key findings include:
1) "HOPE VI and mixed-use finance redevelopments have been able to bring market
activity and quality of life back to long-neglected neighborhoods.
2) Improvements in HOPE VI developments and the surrounding neighborhoods were the
result of well-planned and coordinated urban revitalization plans.
3) There are key policy recommendations, at both the Federal and local levels, to ensure the
success of revitalization efforts."
While there is very little focus on the poverty deconcentration strategies used in the four cases,
the authors do present a caveat under the paper's "Data Issues" section. They find that
"measurable improvements may not merely result from the removal of low income residents
from the neighborhood" Meaning, that there are other causal factors including other
revitalization happening in the broader neighborhood and underlying political and economic
forces that include the HOPE VI strategy, but are not defined by it.
In this paper, the mixed-income development was evaluated holistically, as a comprehensive
driver for economic change in the surrounding neighborhood. My thesis drills down a bit further
and takes a specific element of this mixed-income development, poverty deconcentration, and
attempts to determine causality between the method of poverty deconcentration and broader
neighborhood revitalization.
Similar to Turbov and Piper's paper, Sean Zielenbach's The Economic Impact of HOPE VI on
Neighborhoods (2002) examines the extent to which HOPE VI developments have contributed to
the economic revitalization of distressed neighborhoods surrounding the developments.
Confirming Turbov and Piper's conclusions, Zielenbach finds that, "In short, neighborhood
economic development is a gradual process, one that does not have any clearly definable end
points." He urges readers to view this study as "an analysis of early economic trends associated
with the HOPE VI developments."
Two of the qualitative case studies included HOPE VI projects emphasized a mixed-income
development approach. In the paper's conclusion, Zielenbach briefly mentions that, "Higher
incomes [at these sites] translate into more purchasing power and thus more demand for goods
and services, which can help increase the neighborhood's profit potential in the minds of current
and potential investors." However, he does not specifically frame his questions of neighborhood
revitalization around the strategy of poverty deconcentration employed at the HOPE VI
developments as I have aimed to do in this thesis.
Using quantitative and some qualitative indicators, Zielenbach and his study team considered
socio-economic changes and market indicators in the neighborhoods surrounding eight HOPE VI
developments including: Techwood in Atlanta, Orchard Park in Boston, Earle Village in
Charlotte, Quigg Newton in Denver, Kennedy Brothers in El Paso, Hillside Terrace in
Milwaukee, Richard Allen Homes in Philadelphia, and Holly Park in Seattle. In Boston, Denver,
Milwaukee and Seattle qualitative case studies were conducted to identify changes in market
perceptions of the areas and "particular factors for influencing these changes" (7).
My Contribution to the Literature
Past research on the question of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration and its implications for
broader neighborhood revitalization has been sparse. Listed above are two of the most important
recent studies that aim to evaluate the impact of HOPE VI development on broader
neighborhood revitalization. Absent from these studies is a focused evaluation of the causality
of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration strategies and related implications for broader
neighborhood revitalization. Previous research has been rooted in a comparison of home values,
poverty levels, and employment levels before and after the HOPE VI development and between
neighborhoods with HOPE VI and those without HOPE VI. Without a careful analysis of the
underlying political and economic trends in the subject neighborhood, it is difficult to discern the
place of the HOPE VI development in the continuum of progress and revitalization in the
neighborhood. These studies lack focused discussion and analysis about the role of poverty
deconcentration to capture existing market forces of the neighborhood and to strengthen
partnerships with other public and private investors both within and beyond the HOPE VI
developments.
Quantitative data alone is not enough to understand the impact of HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration on the behavior of public and private investors, which assumedly provide
opportunities for employment and opportunities for increased residential and commercial
development which, in turn, adds to the revitalization of the neighborhood of which HOPE VI is
a part. Very little time has been spent interviewing public and private investors and examining
the underlying neighborhood history and development trends surrounding this claim of HOPE
VI-catalyzed neighborhood revitalization and its relationship to the HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration method used. An attempt must be made to test the effects and outcomes of these
deconcentration strategies as public housing administrators and public and private neighborhood
investors proclaim and rely upon assumptions that HOPE VI poverty deconcentration leads to
broader neighborhood revitalization.
My research presents an analysis of the origins and outcomes of two types of HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration for broader neighborhood revitalization lodged in a larger continuum of
neighborhood redevelopment over time and projected for the future. Qualitative in nature, my
research echoes many of the conclusions presented by Turbov and Piper and Zielenbach,
however through a lens of the HOPE VI poverty deconcentration mandate. The strength of my
research contribution is the focus on interviews with neighborhood players to see how they
perceive the role of HOPE VI as an element in broader neighborhood revitalization.
Methodology
The case study method was selected for this research because existing quantitative methodology
to assess the impact of HOPE VI developments and broader neighborhood revitalization is not
clearly understood without an accompanying qualitative analysis of the stakeholders involved
and context surrounding poverty deconcentration as a HOPE VI development policy for broader
neighborhood revitalization. The case study method provides this missing qualitative analysis.
Many sources of information and evidence, beyond empirical data, were used to reach
conclusions about HOPE VI and its effect on neighborhood revitalization through strategies of
poverty deconcentration.
For each case, the neighborhood was defined by the area in which the HOPE VI administrators
and planners intended to affect and revitalize through the HOPE VI grant. The exact border and
description of these respective neighborhoods are described in each development's chapter. For
this thesis, neighborhood revitalization is defined in terms of the amount of poverty
deconcentration that occurs in the subject neighborhood.
Indictors Used for Measurement
A standard set of measures were developed to present an empirical assessment between two
cases. The aim of these indicators is to demonstrate the variety of influences that determined,
how, when, and why neighborhood revitalization took place in the two cases in relationship to
the strategy of poverty deconcentration employed at both locations.
1) Who was served before and after the HOPE VI development
2) The effect(s) of the change in perception of the neighborhood on the investment
behavior of market and public investment
3) Strategies employed by the HOPE VI administrators to bring about neighborhood
revitalization
4) Management and leasing strategies and their relationship to broader neighborhood
revitalization
5) Differences in local leadership and organizational infrastructure to direct other
resources for neighborhood revitalization to the HOPE VI neighborhood
6) The capacity of the housing authorities to respond to the idea of revitalizing more
than the demolished public housing.
7) The use of HOPE VI dollars to leverage additional neighborhood reinvestment and
produce additional housing units
8) Amenities, both public and private, and their alignment with the needs of the HOPE
VI resident population
9) The importance of creating a mixed-income community to revitalize the
neighborhood
10) The difference in public social services since the deconcentration of poverty occurred
Sources of Evidence
1) Documents including memoranda, written reports of events, HOPE VI planning and
production proposals, progress reports, other studies and evaluations of the HOPE VI
sites, and newsclippings and other mass media.
2) Archival records, including records that show who was served by the HOPE VI
development and its preceding public housing, organizational charts of stakeholder
involvement, budgets for the HOPE VI project including sources and uses, maps and
charts of each HOPE VI location and its surrounding neighborhood, and survey data that
indicates economic change that has been previously collected about each site.
3) Focused interviews in which stakeholders central to each case were interviewed for
approximately one to two hours about a particular set of questions regarding to the
research question, adapted conversationally for each interviewee.
Methodology Obstacles
While a good many conclusions may be drawn from the empirical research presented in this
thesis, some methodological obstacles must be made clear.
1) Other influences for neighborhood revitalization are not controlled for when measuring
the effect of HOPE VI on neighborhood revitalization. It is difficult to understand which
neighborhood conditions, be it a new HOPE VI development or other condition, plays a
role in determining outcomes for neighborhood revitalization.
2) The definition of neighborhood revitalization is not universally understood. The meaning
of neighborhood revitalization is subject to the conditions of and context surrounding
each evaluated HOPE VI case.
3) Every HOPE VI development is different in terms of size, geography, level of
administrative and organizational sophistication, and ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic
mix. This underscores the importance of qualitative research, as presented in this thesis,
as an attempt to describe the specific context and circumstances surrounding HOPE VI
neighborhood revitalization in each of the two studied cases.
Chapter Two:
Posadas Sentinel: HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration by Neighborhood-
Based Dispersal
Posadas Sentinel is one of the few HOPE VI projects that actually does what HOPE VI aims to
do.
-Corky Poster6
Posadas Sentinel: HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration by Neighborhood-based Dispersal
Tucson, Arizona's Posadas Sentinel HOPE VI development demonstrates the use and outcomes
of poverty deconcentration for broader neighborhood revitalization through a method of
"neighborhood-based dispersal." This method is characterized by a reduction of the density of
onsite public housing units (for households with incomes less than 50% of area median income)
and the dispersal of public housing units into the wider neighborhood, beyond the bounds of the
HOPE VI development. For Posadas Sentinel, this means that when Connie Chambers, the
former public housing on the Posadas Sentinel site, was demolished and redeveloped, 60 of the
original 200 public housing units were replaced onsite at Posadas. The remaining 140 units were
replaced offsite in 130 newly acquired single family units throughout Tucson, with an additional
10 units reserved for elderly/disabled public housing eligible households. HUD waived the
requirement that these scattered site units be placed in non-poverty, non-minority neighborhoods
because the City scattered the units throughout Tucson.
6 Interview with Corky Poster on 10/14/2005
Exhibit 1: The Map below shows most of the scattered-site units that were acquired by the City
of Tucson to replace 140 public housing units that were not replaced onsite at Posadas Sentinel.
While the sites are scattered throughout Tucson, it is clear that most of these sites are in low-
income census tracts. The addresses of these scattered-site locations were mapped using the
addresses that the Community Services Department used to obtain warranties on the homes
before they were occupied by residents. Not all of the locations given by the City matched actual
addresses and were therefore not plotted on this map. 80 out of 140 scattered site addresses
matched in the GIS geocoding process. 23 out of the original 200 Connie Chambers households
moved into one of these acquired units.
Posadas Sentinel Scattered Site Housing in Census Tracts
With Average Annual Household Income
Legend
0 Scattered Site Units
Average Household Income in 2000
$19,650 - $38,800
$38,801 - $53,200
$53,201 - $72,350
$72,351 - $102,235
$102,236 - $147,820
- Posadas Sentinel Planning Area
Source: City of Tucson, Community Services Department
Map and Geocoding by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006.
Exhibit 2: The map below shows the location of the homeownership units associated with the
development of Posadas Sentinel. These units are in close proximity to Posadas Sentinel and are
available for households up to 80% of area median income.
Homeownership Units Built with Posadas Sentinel
Map by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
This poverty deconcentration method of neighborhood-based dispersal is widely practiced across
the spectrum of HOPE VI developments, but it is uncommon to provide replacement units for
public housing relocatees rather than Section 8 vouchers.7 The outcomes for neighborhood
revitalization in terms of increased public and private investment from this method of poverty
deconcentration may be generalized to other HOPE VI developments where a block of
economically, physically, and socially distressed public housing once caused broader
neighborhood decay and disinvestment and the effect was reversed, in part, by reducing the
number of public housing units on the HOPE VI and dispersing these units for very-low income
households into the broader neighborhood.
This neighborhood-based method of poverty deconcentration was central to the initial Posadas
Sentinel HOPE VI Project Goals, Criteria, and Requirements approved by the City of Tucson,
Mayor and City Council in an effort to, "eliminate distress in a comprehensive community
development strategy" and to "provide for reinvestment in housing and community with regard
to employment opportunities, sustainable economic development, education, parks, culture and
open space" (City of Tucson 1996). Simply put, the City recognized a need for affordable
housing, but did not want policies and planning that would concentrate all of the public housing
units in one geographic area, as the City believed that this concentration would cause
deterioration in the surrounding neighborhood.
The decision to use neighborhood-based dispersal is a critical element of the City's 2001 Public
Housing Authority (PHA) plan, under which Posadas Sentinel was developed. The policy of
scattered site public housing was the dominant characteristic for most of the City's (here, the
Community Services Department) public housing portfolio and has been a successful tactic in
creating mixed-income neighborhoods throughout Tucson while preserving housing for public
housing-eligible households.8 It was the belief of the City that a strategy of neighborhood-based
dispersal of very-low income units would be an important means to achieve goals of
reinvestment in the neighborhood surrounding the former public housing, Connie Chambers.
7 According to Melissa Shaff, FSS Coordinator at the City of Tucson, five original Connie Chambers households
took Section 8 vouchers to replace their housing.
8 Refer to the maps in Exhibits 1 and 2 on pages 35 and 36 to note that these scattered site units were placed in block
groups with a higher median household income than the census tract of Connie Chambers, although these scattered
site units are located in the lowest quintile of median income for the Tucson metropolitan area.
This Posadas Sentinel policy of neighborhood-based dispersal of public housing units was not
new to the City of Tucson. In the mid-1980s, Cressworth Lander, the Director of the Tucson
Housing Authority, adopted one of the nation's first aggressive scattered-site public housing
policies. This historical scattered-site policy provided the proof that this type of poverty
deconcentration worked in Tucson to create healthy, mixed-income neighborhoods with a strong
mix of public and private investment.9 Given the comprehensive nature of the neighborhood
revitalization goals of the Posadas Sentinel development, it was obvious to the project team at
the City's Community Services Department that neighborhood-based dispersal would be the best
way to deconcentrate poverty at the former Connie Chambers site.
Policies and Questions of the Case.
The key policies and factors for neighborhood revitalization to be evaluated in this case are:
(1) The method of poverty deconcentration used (At Posadas Sentinel "neighborhood-based
dispersal", at Mandela Gateway a "development-based dilution", see Chapter Three)
(2) The outcome(s) for neighborhood revitalization related to the method of poverty
deconcentration at the HOPE VI site in terms of increased public and private investment in the
census tracts surrounding the tract containing the HOPE VI development and historical poverty
and median home sale prices in these tracts
(3) The history of the relationship between development (residential, commercial, public
infrastructure) and poverty in the subject census tract and surrounding tracts
(4) The underlying political and economic trends affecting or affected by the subject
neighborhood 0
Specific questions to be answered by this investigation include whether the neighborhood-based
strategy of poverty deconcentration has different challenges, opportunities and results than the
method of development-based dilution (as presented in the Mandela Gateway case in the
following chapter); and, what public and private investment activities were already happening in
9 Refer to Appendix B on page 129 for a full listing of the Tucson Public and Assisted Housing portfolio.
10 In the Posadas Sentinel case the "subject neighborhood" is described as the census tract containing the former
public housing, Connie Chambers, and the new HOPE VI development plus the census tracts surrounding the HOPE
development on all sides. For Posadas Sentinel, the City of Tucson focused on a specific area of emphasis for
neighborhood revitalization efforts which comprises the Greater Santa Rosa Area. Maps of this subject
neighborhood are in Exhibit 4 and 5 on page 42 and 43.
the neighborhood within and beyond Posadas Sentinel that may have influenced the impact of
the HOPE VI poverty deconcentration as a factor for broader neighborhood revitalization.
These questions will be answered through:
A) A description of the history and chronology of the co-evolution (or disintegration) of both the
HOPE VI development and the broader neighborhood. Specifically, the location of the Connie
Chambers scattered site replacement units will be described to test whether these relocated
families where dispersed to areas of low poverty concentration.
B) An identification of the causality between HOPE VI poverty deconcentration and
neighborhood revitalization through interviews of public and private investors to gauge the
influence of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration upon investment behavior in the neighborhood.
It is difficult to describe the causal relationship between a particular method of HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration and its supposed outcomes for broader neighborhood revitalization. This
causality challenge is present in the Posadas Sentinel case as much of the infill development in
the subject neighborhood has been occurring since the 1970s. The small amount of retail and
commercial development has remained mostly stagnant since 1970, if not declined slightly.
However, residential development has increased as inversely the availability of developable
parcels in the barrio have decreased significantly since 1970. Through interviews, historic
document review, and census analysis it is clear that Posadas Sentinel, with its neighborhood-
based dispersal of poverty, has been an important catalyst in the continuum of public and private
investment in the Barrio Santa Rosa that began in 1970, and has likely shaped the way the Barrio
will develop in the future. Examples of this catalytic effect will follow.
The exhibit below shows current land use in the Posadas Sentinel Planning area. This map
indicates that in 2006, the Barrio Santa Rosa land use pattern is largely dominated by single -
and multi-family housing. There is very little vacant land available or developable in the Barrio
Santa Rosa. For a comparison of land use over time see Appendix C on page 130.
Exhibit 3: Current Land Use in the Posadas Sentinel Study Area, May 2006
Source: City of Tucson
Map by: Carrie Vanderford, 2006
Posadas Sentinel Planning
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The Subiect Neighborhood: A Geographic Orientation
The planning area for Posadas Sentinel included the Barrio Santa Rosa, Barrio Historica, and
West Ochoa neighborhoods which comprise the Greater Santa Rosa Area. The City used these
boundaries to as a way to include neighborhoods surrounding the former Connie Chambers
housing with the aim of planning for revitalization beyond the actual HOPE VI development.
These three neighborhoods include, in part, the area that was once affected by the City's urban
renewal schemes of the 1960s as many low-income Mexican American households relocated
from the adjacent Barrio Viejo to the Greater Santa Rosa Area as their homes were destroyed."
Though all three neighborhoods were considered in the planning process, the Barrio Santa Rosa
was designated as a separate "area of influence" to indicate the focus of the most intense
planning issues and the site of the new Posadas Sentinel development (City of Tucson 1996).
The Physical boundaries of the planning area include:
1) Cushing Street to the north
2) The eastern border is Stone Avenue until it connects with South 6th Avenue at 1 8 th Street
3) South along 6th Avenue to the northern border of the city of South Tucson.
4) The alley between 2 5 th Street and 2 6 th Street forms the southern boundary
5) Interstate 10 is the western boundary back up to Cushing Street
6) The economic development planning for this project included most of 6 th Avenue
See Exhibit 9 for a map the Barrio Viejo in relation to the Barrio Santa Rosa on page 49.
Exhibit 4: Context Map
Map by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
Source: ESRI Data and Maps, 2005.
Context Map of Posadas Sentinel Study Area
in the Greater Tucson Area (2005)
ESRI Data & Maps [DVD]. (2005). Redlands, CA: Environmental Systems Research Institute.
Exhibit 5: Posadas Sentinel Study Area
Map by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
Source: City of Tucson and the Arizona Department of Transportation
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Why were HOPE VI funds pursued for Connie Chambers?
Originally, HOPE VI funds were pursued for the site because the City and its public housing
agency (The Community Services Department, Housing Management Division) believed that the
Connie Chambers site was the housing of last resort in the City's public housing portfolio and
that it was severely physically and socially distressed. The only other concentrated public
housing in the City's portfolio in 1996 (the year that HOPE VI funds were granted for Connie
Chambers) was Robert F. Kennedy Homes, which included 80 public housing units." The
original Connie Chambers HOPE VI grant application states, "This property (Connie Chambers)
is not feasible to rehabilitate. No amount of money can ever realistically ameliorate the inherent
site/design deficiencies causing distress, nor rectify 30 years of disinvestment and deterioration it
led to in neighborhood barrios, nor heal the indelible stigma that the complex and its vulnerable
residents elicit community-wide" (City of Tucson 1996). Connie Chambers was the City's
largest development of concentrated public housing.
Exhibit 6: Pictures of Connie Chambers before its demolition. 1996.
Pictures provided by: Corky Poster
At the time of the City's HOPE VI application (1996), the population of the Greater Santa Rosa
area was largely poor, predominantly Mexican American, and lacking essential community
services such as job placement services and daycare (City of Tucson 1996). During 1995, as the
planning for Posadas Sentinel took place, 90% of Connie Chambers households were headed by
single females with children. 50% of families' average earned income was less than 30% of the
12 The City won a FY2000 HOPE VI grant for the redevelopment of Kennedy Homes, its second HOPE VI grant. A
third HOPE VI grant was won in FY 2005 for the revitalization of Martin Luther King Apartments, which is a 96
unit elderly/disabled high rise development.
applicable Federal poverty levels, household turnover was 30%.13 Indeed, the census tract
containing Connie Chambers and those census tracts immediately surrounding the development
represented pockets of high poverty since 1970. In fact, with the exception of 1990, from 1970-
2000 the census tract in which Posadas Sentinel is located has had the lowest annual household
income compared to all abutting tracts. It is interesting, yet unexplainable, why the census tract
to the north of Connie Chambers in 1990 had the lowest annual household income.
Exhibit 7: Map of Census Tracts from 1970-2000.
1 A 30% turnover rate is quite high for public housing. When asked why the turnover rate was so high, the Posadas
Sentinel Project Manager Olga Osterhage responded that residents reported feeling unsafe at the Connie Chambers
property and that their own families were hesitant to visit them for fear that their vehicles would be vandalized or
that they would be threatened. Residents felt that the site was not safe. Also, families did not like "families living
on top of other families."
Given the commitment from a variety of public and private partners, HOPE VI offered an
opportunity to engage these investors in the redevelopment of housing and the surrounding
neighborhood as funds were leveraged for broader neighborhood revitalization. When the HOPE
VI grant was received, public and private partners had already taken an interest in the Greater
Santa Rosa Area. The strategy of neighborhood-based deconcentration was important to these
partnerships because the strategy helped to position the new HOPE VI development as a model
for the mixed income community that the City and private investors envisioned for the Barrio
Santa Rosa on a broader scale. The City of Tucson and related stakeholders saw potential in the
revitalization of the Santa Rosa Area and it was clear to them that they could make a difference
in the way it the neighborhood was developed by taking part in the HOPE VI planning process.
14,15
Karen Thoreson, the former Director of the Department of Community Services, is quoted in the
Tucson Weekly as listing five reasons for obtaining the HOPE VI funds for the Connie
Chambers site (Devine 2002).
1) Opportunities to improve housing for Connie Chambers residents
2) Improvement of public facilities including the development of child-care, learning and
recreational centers in the neighborhood
3) Infrastructure improvements along south 1 0 th avenue
4) Economic development efforts, including an $18,500 market feasibility study for possible
new businesses along south Sixth Avenue; and
5) Achieving the overall goal "that people would be better off, safer and feel better about
where they live but retain the unique character [of the barrio]."
"4 Stakeholders involved in the HOPE VI planning process included: Tucson Unified School District; various City
departments including Parks, Library, IT, and Transportation; non-profit housing builders; the Santa Rosa
neighborhood association and Connie Chambers tenants; the City Manager and the City Council; and local infill
developers (including two are that interviewed for this thesis).
15 Interview with Olga Osterhage, 2/25/2006
The History and Chronolo2v of the Deterioration and Revitalization of Posadas Sentinel
and the Greater Santa Rosa Area
Before evaluating the impact of the demolition of Connie Chambers and the development of
Posadas Sentinel, the development and eventual demolition of Tucson's very first permanent
public housing project, La Reforma must be understood. Public housing in the Greater Santa
Rosa Area, including La Reforma, Connie Chambers, and Posadas Sentinel, has an important
link to Tucson's 1960 urban renewal efforts which bears heavily on the placement of Posadas
Sentinel in the continuum of the area's revitalization. Below is a description of La Reforma,
Connie Chambers, and Posadas Sentinel placed a timeline of development, destruction, and
revitalization followed by a narrative of important underlying policy and economic trends in the
co-evolution of these developments and their surrounding neighborhood.16
Timeline
1942 - February: The Tucson Housing Authority (THA), put out a request for bids to construct
a 162-unit low-cost housing project as officials recognized a need for affordable housing in
Tucson. This housing project, La Reforma, was the City's first public housing development and
was built to provide housing for Mexican American families living in the Barrio Santa Rosa. 17
The THA announced that due to a "war emergency," defense-employed families would be given
priority to live in La Reforma over other low-income Mexican American families (Kelly 16). It
was named La Reforma in reference to the period in Mexican history when Emperor Maximillian
was overthrown, and the Republic of Mexico was established.
1943 - January: La Reforma began to fill with its first residents. Most of these residents were
families of wartime workers (WWII).
1946: The Federal Public Housing Authority required the Tucson Housing Authority to revert to
its original purpose of housing Mexican American low-income families at La Reforma.
16 This timeline was developed using a variety of sources including clippings from the Arizona Daily Star,
interviews with housing authority officials and public housing residents, and the book Don't Look at Me Different:
Voices from the Projects Edited by Regina Kelly and published by Tucson Voices Press.
17 There would be no other construction of City-owned low-income housing until Connie Chambers was developed,
some twenty years later.
1962: The demand for more public housing was projected to increase as plans for urban renewal
in the adjacent Barrio Viejo were in progress. The Tucson Housing Authority asked the city to
build 200 more La Reforma units in anticipation of the low-income families that would need to
be relocated as a result of these urban renewal efforts. Already, the development was becoming
one of last resort, as people were relocated there when they had no where else to go after the
urban renewal destruction. Mr. Connie W. Chambers, the authority's executive director at that
time, asked for the new units to be built next to La Reforma, on the west side. As a result, the
City's only two public housing developments were positioned in close proximity, effectively
creating a ghetto of concentrated low-income Mexican Americans. This would be the only
publicly sponsored ghetto in Tucson, as it was the only area in Tucson where there would be
such a density of poverty. This low-income, isolated nature of Connie Chambers was its
predominant characteristic from the start.
Exhibit 8: Site map of Connie Chambers and La Reforma as the developments would have
appeared in 1967. Map adapted from Don't Look at Me Different: Voices from the Projects.
18 See the map of the Barrio Viejo and its relationship to the Greater Santa Rosa Area in Exhibit 9 on page 49.
1964: By 1964 the forces of urban renewal descended upon the Barrio Viejo as Tucson's urban
renewal plan gave local officials the power to demolish 80 acres of historic buildings including
300 Sonoran adobes. 19 About 1,200 people were uprooted and forced to relocate as the Tucson
Convention Center, downtown governmental buildings and other surrounding structures were
built (Devine 2002).
Exhibit 9: Map of Barrio Viejo in relation to Barrio Santa Rosa
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19 Before 1960, downtown Tucson (Barrio Viejo) included a high percentage of Tucson's population. Barrio Viejo
contained some of the first residences in the City, where immigrants from Mexico established themselves and their
businesses.
1967: Families began to move into the new La Reforma units. City Officials began to refer to
the new units as Connie Chambers in memoriam of the former housing authority executive Mr.
Connie W. Chambers, who died two years prior, in 1965. As Connie Chambers was being built,
the City's urban renewal plans were in full force as 29 city blocks were demolished in and
around the Barrio Santa Rosa. Many of the people that were displaced through this demolition
ended up at Connie Chambers public housing.2 0
1970 - December: An article appeared in the Arizona Daily Star by Jeff Smith. He reported
that the City of Tucson was pursuing the construction of 120 scattered site public housing units.
He wrote, "More than 160 poor families live in La Reforma... [the] row upon row of barracks-
like apartments are tough and enduring, but they concentrate poverty into the 'project' - with its
attendant social stigma" (Kelly 23). This proposal to construct 120 scattered site units of public
housing represents the City's first policy discussion to deconcentrate poverty through the
neighborhood-based dispersal method.
The gentrification of the Greater Santa Rosa area began in the 1970s as middle income families
began to move into the Barrio. As land values rose, conflicts emerged around architecture and
land use between the new Anglos in the neighborhood and Mexican-American families who had
been in the Barrio for several generations. The gentrification that began in 1970 has continued to
present day.
Based on a historic scan of assessed property values for the years 1990, 1996, 2000, and 2006 it
appears that single family home values remained fairly stable until 2000. From 2000-2006,
property values escalated significantly and the amount of available, developable land was greatly
reduced in the Barrio Santa Rosa.2 1 This rapid appreciation of single family homes is mostly
due to escalating home prices rather than new construction, although infill rehab construction has
contributed significantly to the rise is median home value.
20 Email from Corky Poster on 4/14/2006.
21 See Appendix D on page 131 for a recent survey of property value escalation in the Barrio Santa Rosa.
Annual Home Sale Data for Zip Code 85701
Source: DataQuick Information Systems
Year Median Price Sales
1995 $73,200 28
1996 $74,500 32
1997 $90,000 35
1998 $110,000 35
1999 $104,500 41
2000 $97,000 39
2001 $132,000 33
2002 $119,500 36
2003 $212,000 63
2004 $253,000 67
2005 $284,000 69
YTD200 $284,235 18 85701 is the Barrio Santa Rosa zip code.
1974: City Councilman Ruben Romero proposed that La Reforma be demolished and that the
public housing families be scattered in units around Tucson. The Arizona Daily Star reported
that they would like to see "La Reforma replaced with homes owned by middle-class 'non
minority' families in order to "bring a new balance to the neighborhood and its schools and bring
an economic lift to the neighborhood and to downtown, just a few blocks away." This article
indicates two things: One, there was a perceived economic connection between the revitalization
of the Santa Rosa Area and the adjacent Downtown Tucson, and two, that there was a recognized
concentration of poverty in the Greater Santa Rosa Area comprised mostly of non-whites.
1979: Joel D. Valdez, the Tucson City Manager, applied to HUD to have La Reforma closed
out. The application stated that, "La Reforma contributes to undue concentration of low income
families in the area which is inconsistent with city and HUD objectives" (Kelly 24). This
application suggests a policy orientation of the City toward public housing development that
aims to eliminate high concentrations of public housing. While in most cities 200 units would
not be considered a high concentration of public housing, in Tucson this was the largest
traditional public housing development in the City's portfolio both then and now.
1983: La Reforma was demolished and scattered-site public housing units were purchased for
the households of the former La Reforma development.22
1995: The City was awarded a HOPE VI planning grant to develop a comprehensive plan for
the Connie Chambers project and the Greater Santa Rosa neighborhood.
1996: The City of Tucson was awarded a $14.6 million HOPE VI Demolition and Revitalization
Grant.
2001: Families began to move into Posadas Sentinel. The Community Services Department at
the City also acquired 140 newly constructed scattered site units for former Connie Chambers
residents. Seventeen Connie Chambers families returned to Posadas Sentinel, while 23 of the
original 200 households at Connie Chambers went to the new scattered site units.
Approximately 77 other Connie Chambers households moved into either an existing scattered
site unit or an existing traditional public housing unit. Of these 77 households, 13 moved into
elderly disabled housing. Five other Connie Chambers households elected to take a Section 8
voucher. This means that approximately 122 of the original 200 households at Connie Chambers
were either relocated to another subsidized unit or returned to Posadas Sentinel.23 No records
were disclosed about the relocation of the remaining 78 original Connie Chambers households.
2006: Barrio Santa Rosa is featured in Sunset Magazine as the "Best New City
Neighborhood"(Whiteley 2006).
Four Underlying policy and economic trends in the co-evolution of La Reforma, Connie
Chambers, and Posadas Sentinel and the Greater Santa Rosa Area.
The four over-arching policy and economic trends listed below serve to illuminate the main
fixtures of the history and projected future of the Greater Santa Rosa Area that are meaningful to
22 The former La Reforma parcel sat vacant and divided the Barrio for a decade. In the mid-nineties the parcel was
bought from the City by a big developer and then later re-sold to the City. As part of HOPE VI, this parcel became
a public park and included a new school.
23 Verified by Olga Osterhage, 5/16/2006
the development of Posadas Sentinel and its related policy of neighborhood-based dispersion
poverty deconcentration.
1) Tucson's 1960 Urban Renewal Policies were not soon forgotten. Per the timeline above,
Connie Chambers was originally developed to house those that had been displaced by the urban
renewal efforts in the adjacent Barrio Viejo.2 From the very beginning of the Posadas planning
process, Tucson's Community Services Department aimed to gain the trust of the Connie
Chambers residents by separating the process of poverty deconcentration from the scarring
memories of the urban renewal projects of the 1960s. To do this, the City spent one year
working with the community to develop a plan that would address this skepticism while
convincing the residents of Connie Chambers and the broader neighborhood that without HOPE
VI, Connie Chambers would remain the same - an isolated island of concentrated poverty.
Posadas Sentinel was positioned not as another version of urban renewal, but rather as a remedy
to the isolation and segregation that urban renewal victims experienced as they had no other
choice but to move to Connie Chambers. When Connie Chambers was demolished, the City of
Tucson's Department of Community Services made a pledge to the City of Tucson and its
residents, particularly the neighbors in the Barrio Santa Rosa, that the replacement housing
would surpass the former housing in terms of safety and design and would catalyze turnaround in
the broader neighborhood.
The decision to demolish Connie Chambers was put to a vote by the residents as a result of a
significant outreach effort by the neighborhood and tenant organization, the Pima County
Interfaith Council. There was significant opposition to the demolition and revitalization of
Connie Chambers from the broader neighborhood. However, the Connie Chambers resident vote
24 See Exhibit 9 on page 49 for a map of Barrio Viejo in relation to Barrio Santa Rosa
25 Three tenant and neighborhood organizations emerged during the planning process for Posadas Sentinel. The
existing tenant organization at Connie Chambers was a fairly strong organization that represented Connie
Chambers' Hispanic and African American residents. Another neighborhood organization, representing those
outside of the Connie Chambers development, was made up of affluent white residents and older Hispanics. Perhaps
the loudest and most organized resident group was the Pima County Interfaith Council (PCIC). This Saul Alinsky-
type group was founded in the early 1990s. At the instigation of the PCIC leader, the organization began a one on
one outreach strategy to talk to people about their fears around the demolition and revitalization of the Connie
Chambers housing. PCIC's position on the HOPE VI development was that all Connie Chambers residents wanted
to stay in the neighborhood, and that there should not be any scattered-site displacement of Connie Chambers
residents, nor should there be development-based poverty deconcentration.
was 60-40 in favor of demolishing Connie Chambers. In an effort to prove that the demolition
and revitalization of Connie Chambers would not be a repeat of the horrific displacements of the
1960s, the City's Community Service Department was very focused on ensuring that each
Connie Chambers resident had a fair opportunity to either return to Posadas Sentinel or be
relocated to a scattered site public housing unit. Weekly tours of rehousing options were offered
by the City. These tours served to quell Connie Chambers residents' fears of losing their home
with the development of Posadas Sentinel. The two Connie Chambers residents interviewed for
this paper acknowledge that the rehousing process was fair and transparent. 26
2) Forces of gentrification created high demand for the preservation of affordable housing
in the Greater Santa Rosa Area. As the Greater Santa Rosa Area continues to enjoy
investment by infill residential development, property values are increasing and have been since
1970. This trend put tremendous pressure on the City to use the HOPE VI grant as a mechanism
to preserve affordable housing in the Barrio Santa Rosa.
Without the mix of affordable homeownership and rental opportunities for low-moderate income
families, the Barrio Santa Rosa could have "fallen to the wealthy within 20 years" (Volante
2001). The market potential of the Barrio is strong because it is very close to downtown Tucson,
where new investment and redevelopment will likely increase the marketability of the Santa
Rosa area neighborhoods for homeownership and retail opportunities at market rate rents and
sale prices. The City's scattered-site affordable component creates a mixed-income fabric
throughout the Greater Santa Rosa Area while reserving 60 units of traditional public housing
onsite at Posadas Sentinel. However, most of these scattered-site replacement units were placed
in Tucson neighborhoods with the lowest household income per census tract in quintile
categories.
3) The Barrio Santa Rosa, the focused neighborhood in which La Reforma, Connie
Chambers, and Posadas Sentinel were located, had to be developed in a way that would end
its isolation from the rest of the Greater Santa Rosa Area. Neighborhood-based poverty
Deconcentration was a key element to this "de-ghettoization" effort by the City.
26 Interviews with former Connie Chambers residents Bobbie Hemphill, 2/2/2006 and Patricia Alvidrez, 2/1/2006.
These interviews were arranged by Olga Osterhage of the Community Services Department.
The HOPE VI plan for Posadas reflected the City's policy of neighborhood-based dispersal of
public housing as a poverty deconcentration method. In order for Posadas Sentinel to be a true
fixture and catalyst along the already occurring reinvestement and revitalization of the Greater
Santa Rosa Area, it was important that the new development "look and feel" as if it belonged in
the neighborhood. The City's poverty deconcentration policy went a long way to solve this
problem as the resident character of Posadas was markedly different than that of Connie
Chambers, and the Posadas development was part of a larger revitalization effort that included
more than just the production and preservation of affordable housing, but also leveraged monies
for a public park improvement, the construction of a new public school, a new community
center, streetscaping, and economic development planning.27 By the time construction began on
Posadas Sentinel, the original $14.6 million of HOPE VI money was leveraged into $49.4
million dollars in public and private investment aimed at housing, commercial, and public
infrastructure improvement in the Greater Santa Rosa Area (City of Tucson 1996).
As the Posadas Sentinel HOPE VI project was built on the former La Reforma and Connie
Chambers sites (the park was preserved), the City hoped to undo the perception of the "instant
ghetto" that once was developed there when La Reforma and Connie Chambers were placed side
by side. Critical to this goal was the reuse of the former La Reforma site as a usable public space
that would benefit the broader community, beyond the HOPE VI development. Before its
redevelopment, this so-called park was vacant parcel of land with no usability for the public
housing residents much less the broader community. The physical plan of Posadas sought to
strategically use the vacant piece of land next to Connie Chambers as a connector to the rest of
the neighborhood and to fill it with a use that would benefit the entire Santa Rosa neighborhood.
Corky Poster, the principal architect on the Posadas Sentinel project states, "With the HOPE VI
plan, we tried to develop the La Reforma Parcel into something that everybody could use. We
wanted it to be a land use that would be shared in common with the rest of the neighborhood." 28
27 All public housing eligible residents at Connie Chambers were required to take part in the Family Self-Sufficiency
program whereas Connie Chambers residents were not. Also adding to the different resident character of the
development was the fact that there were households with incomes up to 80% of area median income onsite.
28 Interview with Corky Poster, 10/14/2005
Exhibit 10: Left -- Picture of the vacant La Reforma parcel that was next to Connie Chambers
until a new park was built alongside Posadas Sentinel. Right - The Site Plan for the new park
that would replace the vacant and underused parcel that once was La Reforma.
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Picture and site plan from: Corky Poster
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, at the time of the HOPE VI application (1996), the population
of the Greater Santa Rosa neighborhood was largely poor, predominantly Mexican-American,
and lacking essential community services such as job placement services and daycare (City of
Tucson 1996). Connie Chambers' census tract and the surrounding tracts represented high
pockets of poverty compared to other parts of Tucson.29
Adding to the isolation of Connie Chambers and its surrounding neighborhood was the out of
place architectural features of Connie Chambers. Unlike the surrounding Sonoran architecture of
rammed earth and adobe materials, the architecture of Connie Chambers featured spread
concrete footings, uninsulated concrete block, precast concrete slabs, steel doors, and vinyl
floors. In part, as a result of vast difference in architectural style between the former public
housing and the surrounding market-rate residential uses, Connie Chambers was the only easily
identifiable public housing development in Tucson.
29 See Exhibit 7 on page 45 for a comparison of household income among census tracts.
Many Tucson public housing applicants rejected living at Connie Chambers because of its
perceived stigma as a place that was unsafe and substandard in relation to other public housing in
the City of Tucson's portfolio. In fact, the vernacular description of Connie Chambers by its
residents and people outside of the development was "the projects." This was the only site with
this pejorative designation in the City's public housing portfolio. 30 Although the City of Tucson
typically has a public housing waiting list that hovers around 2,000 households, when offered an
opportunity to live in Connie Chambers, qualified households would often chose to go back to
the bottom of the list rather than live in the housing.3 1 Olga Osterhage, the project manager for
Posadas Sentinel and the transition coordinator for residents of Connie Chambers states, "The
people that were taking a unit at Connie Chambers had absolutely no other options. They were
the more needy and most difficult to house." 32
During the planning phase for Posadas Sentinel, several major planning issues were identified
through the Comprehensive Community Development Plan for the Greater Santa Rosa Area
(Drachman Institute Community Report 1995).3 Many of these issues indicate the community-
wide perception of the Connie Chambers development as an unsafe, unwelcoming, pocket of
concentrated poverty. The report finds that resident safety was the greatest concern of Connie
Chambers residents as well as residents in the general neighborhood. "This perception has led to
further isolation of the community from its neighborhood, and has made renting apartments
difficult because of applicants' fears of being victims of crime." Specific to the Connie
Chambers development, participants listed: "What is the future of Connie Chambers? Can we
end its isolation?" And, "What do we do about crime and security?" (City of Tucson 1996).
4) Revitalizing the Greater Santa Rosa Area by building on existing market potential for
commercial development through an economic development strategy included in HOPE VI
planning.
30 See Appendix B on page 129 for a full description of the City's portfolio of public housing.
31 Interview with Corky Poster, 10/14/2005
32 Interview with Olga Osterhage, 2/21/06
33 This report is a Santa Rosa area neighborhood community development plan which was written under the
direction of the Drachman Institute at the University of Arizona. The plan was developed with a high-degree of
neighborhood participation and addresses neighborhood needs for retail, school, and business development. The
plan describes the revitalization needs of the Santa Rosa area and represents a neighborhood consensus.
Included in the HOPE VI Revitalization Plans for Posadas Sentinel was an economic
development strategy for the businesses along the eastern boarder of the planning area, 6th
Avenue. Part of the work to reduce the isolation of the Greater Santa Rosa Neighborhood
included the opportunity to improve the number and type of businesses along 6th Avenue. The
City included this area in the HOPE VI plan because they saw a link between the economic
viability of the area and the overall health of the neighborhood, beyond Posadas Sentinel. The
original HOPE VI grant states, "The economic gains created by the revitalization along South 6th
Avenue and 22 Street will be inured by residents of the community in the form of job
opportunities and increased availability of products and services."
With higher household incomes and more housing in the Greater Santa Rosa Area, it appeared
that the HOPE VI money could be leveraged to attract businesses to the 6th Avenue area to help
remedy the perception that residents felt that it was not safe to walk or shop in that area of town.
This economic development focus is closely tied to the HOPE VI neighborhood-based poverty
deconcentration strategy as the City hoped to position Posadas as an attractive development in
the Santa Rosa Area that would be appealing to commercial investors along 6 th Avenue. It was
hoped that a policy of neighborhood-based poverty deconcentration would position Posadas
Sentinel as a catalyst in the market rather than an economically isolated and socially segregated
development that Connie Chambers once was. At the time of the HOPE VI application for
Connie Chambers, the Greater Santa Rosa Neighborhood suffered from lack of jobs, stable
businesses and other economic opportunities for its residents. Again, the HOPE VI grant
application states, "As it has been discussed and identified from the onset of the HOPE VI
planning grant application, Connie Chambers and the greater Santa Rosa neighborhood need
economic stimulus"(City of Tucson 2006).
The Strategy of Neighborhood-Based Poverty Deconcentration for Posadas Sentinel
Tuscon's Community Services Department viewed poverty deconcentration as a central element
in the larger strategy to use HOPE VI to change the perception of the neighborhood from one of
isolated poverty to an integrated, economically diverse community. The idea that guides this
policy is that a high concentration of poverty in one place is inversely related to the viability and
sustainability of public housing. Therefore, the City reasoned that a reduction in onsite poverty
concentration at Connie Chambers would lead to a more viable and sustainable HOPE VI
development. A deconcentration of poverty and the accompanying change in the resident make-
up of the HOPE VI development was expected to serve as a way to integrate Posadas into the
rest of the neighborhood, thereby creating broader neighborhood revitalization benefits.
Based on interviews with the Department of Community Services and other stakeholders in the
HOPE VI development process, the neighborhood-based strategy of poverty deconcentration was
chosen because there was a consensus among the public and private stakeholders that reducing
the amount of density of poverty in Posadas Sentinel would revitalize the neighborhood by
increasing the median household income in the development, thereby attracting more private
investment and creating a higher tax base for city revenues in the area.
The policy of neighborhood-based dispersion of public housing units has been a fixture of the
City's housing policy since the early 1980s. The 2001 Public Housing Authority Annual Plan
states, "PHA promotes deconcentration through a scattered-site portfolio of public housing.
Development consists of small complexes from two to twenty units." More recently, the 2006
Draft Annual Plan provides for the "deconcentration of poverty and encourage income mixing by
bringing higher income families into lower income developments and lower income families into
higher income developments" (City of Tucson 2006).
The City's expected results of this poverty deconcentration were two-fold. Olga Osterhage, the
project manager for Posadas Sentinel, states, "We wanted mixed income housing for a couple of
reasons. One, is that you need the higher incomes to support the lower income housing. We
hoped to subsidize the overall operating cost with higher rents from some units. Two, is the
positive role-modeling concept. That is, people see others going to work or going to school -
then they see that they too can also go to school or to work." Evidence of this role-model effect
is indicated as Posadas Sentinel residents were invited to sit with neighborhood homeowners on
the Parks & Recreation Operations Committee, which has traditionally only been attended by
homeowners.34 This indicates that renters are taking pride in their neighborhood and can envision
3 The Parks & Recreation Operations Committee decides on the activities proposed for community facilities.
the possibility of investing in a home in the Santa Rosa Area.35 However, only one of the public
housing residents has gone from Posadas Sentinel to homeownership.
Exhibit 11: Map of Scattered-site units acquired with the development of Posadas Sentinel
Source: City of Tucson, Community Services Department, April 2006.
Twenty-three of the original 200 Connie Chambers residents opted to take one of these units
after Connie Chambers was demolished. Each black dot represents one scattered site unit. This
map is not representative of the entire 140 acquired scattered site units.
The Implications of Neighborhood-based Poverty Dispersal for Broader Neighborhood
Revitalization around Posadas Sentinel
Despite the well developed policy for neighborhood-based poverty deconcentration at Posadas
Sentinel, it is difficult to show causality between this deconcentration and its implications for
broader neighborhood revitalization. In other words, it is not entirely clear whether or not the
3 Email correspondence with Olga Osterhage.
movement of households of poverty away from a public housing site will make a difference in
the revitalization of the broader neighborhood.
Multiple conversations with staff at Tucson's Community Services Department indicated that
while the strategy of poverty deconcentration appeared to be effective in helping to revitalize the
neighborhood, there were no clear measurements of this particular outcome. Meaning both that
they did not measure it, and also that they are not sure how to measure it properly. One specific
measure of this neighborhood revitalization might be to compare the poverty rates in the
surrounding census tracts before and after the HOPE VI development was completed. However,
the timing of this development does not allow for a mere survey of census data to reveal any real
change. Furthermore, given the underlying gentrification trend that is occurring in the
neighborhood, it is difficult to separate the revitalization of Connie Chambers as a catalyst for
neighborhood revitalization.
The more interesting investigation is the way in which the development and investment posture
of interested public and private stakeholders changed in the neighborhood after the HOPE VI
development was completed. For this thesis, this information was gathered through interviews
of major residential investors in the neighborhood. Two of these interviews are highlighted
below. These two residential developers were involved with the Posadas Sentinel planning and
have been developing infill housing in the Barrio Santa Rosa for over 15 years.
Additionally, research was conducted into the outcomes for the economic development planning
that was part of the Posadas HOPE VI grant. This strategy of interviewing begins to test some of
the assumptions for neighborhood revitalization that the City had hoped would be catalyzed by
Posadas Sentinel, in part, by its strategy for neighborhood-based poverty deconcentration. In
many ways, it the revitalization in and around Posadas Sentinel happened not as the investors
understood the impact of poverty deconcentration, but investors clearly noticed that the area
"looked better and felt safer." Many elements beyond the neighborhood-based poverty
deconcentration strategy contributed to this perception.
1) Streetscape improvements now serve to reconnect the HOPE VI development to the
rest of the Greater Santa Rosa Area and diminish the previous perception of the
area as a concentrated pocket of poverty. Funding was leveraged from the City
Department of Transportation and the Department of Parks and Recreation for public
infrastructure improvements including sidewalks, curbs, and lighting. The previously
vacant and unused land where La Reforma once stood, immediately to the south of
Connie Chambers, was developed as a public amenity to be shared by all. Additionally,
the area became friendlier as it was easier for pedestrians to have "eyes on the street" as
pedestrian and bicycle improvements were leveraged.
2) More detailed criteria are used to screen potential tenants at Posadas Sentinel.
Stricter guidelines now determine which type of public housing residents will be living at
Posadas. To be admitted to Posadas Sentinel, applicants must give the manager three
years rental history, must undergo a complete criminal background check, and undergo a
credit history check. The applicant's employment history and history of court
proceedings is evaluated for the past three years. 36 While there is no specific time that
prospective residents must work nor a specific credit score that applicants must obtain,
applicants to Posadas must not have ever been evicted, must not have back-rent due at
another development and must not have reports of bad housekeeping from other
developments.
To get into a unit at Posadas, all public housing families had to be enrolled in the City's
Family Self-Sufficiency Program.3 7  This was a long-term strategy for neighborhood
revitalization because it served to increase the incomes and related buying power of the
residents at Posadas Sentinel. According to the original HOPE VI grant, "The program,
though it can only impact certain selected families, will have a direct stabilizing impact
on the neighborhood through increased homeownership in the community, job creation,
and increased household income" (City of Tucson 1996). The idea of public housing
36 Interview with Voni Romero Harris, 5/5/2006
37 FSS was enacted in 1990. The intent of the program is to help public housing residents increase their assets and
achieve homeownership or other personal goals. Each FSS participant works with a case manager to develop an
individual plan to access work-promoting services in the community. As the household's income increases due to
increased earnings, an amount equal to the rent increase is deposited into an the participant's escrow account. Upon
graduation (after five years maximum), the participant receives all funds in the escrow account to be used for
educational or homeownership or other personally identified needs.
residents' mandatory participation in the Family Self Sufficiency program illuminates the
reality that not only would very low-income households be deconcentrated to revitalize
the neighborhood, but that the very low income households that actually lived at Posadas
Sentinel would be very different than the poor that once lived at Connie Chambers.
After five years, FSS participants must graduate from the program and leave the Posadas
Sentinel development. At Posadas, most of the Family Self-Sufficiency graduates either
apply for Section 8 vouchers, find a unit on the market and pay market rate rent, or apply
for a scattered site public housing unit.38
Public and Private Investment in the Greater Santa Rosa Area after Posadas Sentinel
While some of the developers that were interviewed for this thesis did not cite the poverty
deconcentration as a specific strategy that has catalyzed investment in the neighborhood
surrounding Connie Chambers, they mention a "feeling" of safety, pride from the tenants, and
the way that Posadas looks as signals that the barrio is a good place to invest. The three
interviews recounted below were chosen to highlight because these developers represent the bulk
of residential development in the Barrio Santa Rosa and were involved with the planning of and
neighborhood discussion around Posadas Sentinel.
Private Investment
Michael Keith has been a developer in the neighborhood around Posadas Sentinel for over 20
years. He is the President and Founder of Contemporary West Development, based in Barrio
Santa Rosa. Originally, Mr. Keith was very opposed to the demolition of Connie and the
construction of Posadas. His original view was that Connie Chambers was not in bad shape, and
that the taxpayers' money could have been used to produce new units rather than demolish
Connie Chambers.
He notes that before Connie Chambers was demolished, it had become an easily identifiable
piece of public housing property. He remembers that it was out of neighborhood context in
terms of architectural style, massing, ingress and egress issues, and quality of residents. He
states, "The conditions at Connie Chambers really affected private investment in the
38 Phone interview with Melissa Shaff, 5/5/2006
neighborhood as private sector residents were worried about the crime and gangs in the
development and would not move any where near it."
Mr. Keith now believes that Posadas Sentinel represents some of the best urban revitalization in
the country. He finds that the site is not isolated from the neighborhood. He states, "It is
beautifully designed in varied architectural form and is now connected to the neighborhood."
For him and other residential developers in the Barrio Santa Rosa, the stigma of public housing
has left as the new tenants at Posadas Sentinel represent a variety of incomes and they appear to
have pride in their housing.
He believes that the Posadas Sentinel project went a long way to solve the problems around the
perception of public housing in the barrio. He states, "Private residential investment has
skyrocketed since Posadas was finished and the crime in the area has gone down considerably."
While not specifically correlated to the strategy of poverty deconcentration at the Connie
Chambers site, Mr. Keith describes a change in perception among developers that shows that the
redevelopment of Connie Chambers represents a signal to the market that the neighborhood has
been transformed and is ready for investment.39
Tom Wuelpern is a private developer that has been developing custom homes in the Barrio
Santa Rosa for over 15 years. He notes the strong interest of the community to preserve the
historical integrity of the barrio. He finds that the residential development that has happened in
the barrio, including Posadas Sentinel, has been a community driven process. He notes, "Before
Connie Chambers was demolished, it was an area of vacant land and broken bottles with a lot of
crime. Now, since Posadas, there is less of a transient population in the neighborhood and the
perception of the public housing has changed considerably. It is now a desirable place to live
that is pedestrian friendly."
He admits, however, that Posadas still feels a bit segregated from the rest of the neighborhood.
While there is much less gang activity and the troublesome tenants have been removed, a
39 Interview with Michael Keith, 2/1/2006
perceived barrier remains between the development and the rest of the neighborhood. He notes
that the development's architecture is in line with the residential design in the surrounding
neighborhood and has served to help integrate the development with the barrio fabric. He finds
that property values in the neighborhoods around Posadas have gone up tremendously since the
demolition of Connie Chambers due mostly to the unique historical and ethnic amenities
presented in the neighborhood, although the demolition of Connie Chambers has helped the
place to look nicer. 40
Public Investment
Economic Development along 6th Avenue.
A group from the Department of Community Services with the City of Tucson conducted a
SWOT 4' analysis of the small business owners in the area near Connie Chambers, before it was
demolished.
Michelle Pierson, project director for the economic development study, found that current
business owners cited that they had to constantly fight a perception that the area was a bad place
to shop. The business owners believed that the perceived high crime rate near Connie Chambers
was bad for their business. Further, business owners cited a great need for streetscape
improvements to boost the access to their businesses.
However, according to Ms. Pierson, the deconcentration of poverty on at Posadas Sentinel was a
signal to the market that the neighborhood was a safe place to live and invest as market rate
residential prices began to triple. Nonetheless, retailers are still hoping for more "rooftops"
before they will take the risk and invest in the area. She states, "Perhaps if there had been more
money for the City to buy retail and commercial property or funds to entice retail investment,
there would have been greater investment in the neighborhood."
40 Interview with Tom Wulpuern, 2/1/2006
41 SWOT Analysis is a framework to understand the strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats around the
economic development potential near the Connie Chambers housing.
Conclusion: Does the HOPE VI poverty deconcentration method of neighborhood-based
dispersal have any implications for the broader neighborhood?
The neighborhood surrounding Posadas Sentinel was already undergoing revitalization beyond
that which the HOPE VI development could hope to spur. While revitalization spillover was a
key consideration in the chosen neighborhood-based poverty deconcentration strategy, the more
compelling conclusion about this case is that Posadas Sentinel was developed in a way that
preserved affordable housing in a quickly gentrifying part of Tucson. However, many of the
scattered site units were acquired beyond the Barrio, with only 60 public housing units onsite at
Posadas Sentinel. One might conclude that yes, affordable housing was preserved in the Barrio,
but not for the lowest income households.
The market potential for increased public and private investment, including residential and
commercial development, was very high in the Barrio Santa Rosa before Posadas Sentinel was
completed. What makes the poverty deconcentration strategy at Posadas unique is that it was
planned to capture this market potential, while preserving affordable housing with the
recognition that in order for the new HOPE VI development to be truly integrated into the
gentrified Barrio, there would have to be a lower concentration of poverty on the site former
Connie Chambers site. At best, this dispersion based strategy was a way for the city to continue
to serve low-moderate income households in a way that understood the gentrifying forces of the
neighborhood. If Connie Chambers had not been revitalized into what is now Posadas Sentinel,
the island of poverty would have continued and affordable and public housing units would not
have been beneficiaries of the larger redevelopment that was happening in the neighborhood.
According to Olga Osterhage, the Project Manager assigned to Posadas, HOPE VI was different
and superior to the former Connie Chambers housing because:
1. It was no longer the housing of last resort in the City's public housing portfolio.
2. The poverty was not as concentrated as in Connie Chambers.
3. There is now, in Posadas, a variety of incomes that live at Posadas Sentinel. The positive
peer pressure of working families has served to revitalize the housing and its surrounding
neighborhood. There are informal role-models at Posadas.
Exhibit 12: Pictures of Posadas Sentinel
Pictures by: Corky Poster, Architect
Pictures by: Corky Poster, Architect
Strategies used to create the appearance of poverty deconcentration at Posadas Sentinel include:
1. Less poverty, more homeownership, more working households during the day
2. Integrated design - the architecture matched the neighborhood
3. Less isolated street grid
4. New public amenities that benefited the entire neighborhood
5. Private management: "We went with private management of Posadas because we tried to
distance the new housing away from the former housing. This was critical as we hoped
to change the perception of the housing and it was achieved. It was perceived more as a
market rate development rather than 'the projects."' 2
6. Changing the resident character: "The residents that came back to Posadas had very few
problems adjusting to their new surroundings. There were new standards for the
residents." 43 Now, all public housing residents at Posadas Sentinel are upwardly mobile
and are required to participate in the Family Self Sufficiency program. According to
Olga Osterhage, project manager, "Enrollment in the FSS program was very important if
Posadas was not to become a 'project' (referring to Connie Chambers). Residents needed
to understand that this was a new development with new expectations." The Community
Services Department aimed to focus the development of Posadas as not merely a
replacement for Connie Chambers, but rather a place for the future residents that would
be focused on goals of self-sufficiency and homeownership. In order to plan on the
underlying market potential of the Barrio Santa Rosa, there was an understanding the
affordable housing had to be preserved while positioning the Posadas Sentinel residents
as active participants in the economy. In other words, the problem tenants had to be
removed in order to undo the isolation that occurred at Connie Chambers.
The story of Posadas Sentinel's neighborhood based dispersal of low income households is not
finished. I still wonder about the policies behind the City's poverty deconcentration strategy for
dispersal of low income families. With higher and stricter standards and expectations for public
housing families at Posadas Sentinel, it is clear that most of the families that were housed at
Connie Chambers would not be able or willing to come back to Posadas. In fact, only 17 of the
42 Interview with Olga Osterhage, 2/21/2006
43 From interview with Voni Romerio Harris, Metropolitan Housing Corporation
original 200 Connie Chambers households returned to Posadas with an additional 23 households
taking a scattered site unit. That leaves 160 other Connie Chambers households that either took
a Section 8 voucher, found housing outside of the City's public housing portfolio, or took a unit
at another public housing development or at an existing scattered site unit other than those
acquired with the redevelopment of Posadas Sentinel. This is interesting because it demonstrates
that not only was poverty deconcentrated at Posadas Sentinel, but that the type of poverty
allowed to come back to Posadas Sentinel was very different in household character than the
former households of Connie Chambers.
While it was beyond the scope of this thesis to include resident interviews, it is not clear that
housing was improved for all Connie Chambers residents. Sure, many took vouchers or a unit in
another public housing development, but many are not accounted for simply because they
perhaps did not make the cut to get back into Connie Chambers or were not in a position to begin
the Family Self Sufficiency requirement at the development. It does appear, however, that all of
the newly acquired scattered site units were dispersed evenly throughout Tucson, and new
pockets of poverty were not created, even though all of the scattered site units are in lower-
income census tracts than other parts of Tucson.
Overall, Posadas Sentinel presents a story where an island of poverty and isolation was rewoven
with the broader neighborhood. This has had clear benefits for both the residents of the larger
Barrio Santa Rosa and the residents of Posadas Sentinel microneighborhood in terms of shared
public amenities and a reduction of stigma around affordable housing in the rapidly gentrifying
neighborhood. I believe that most of the Connie Chambers residents were treated well, but it is
obvious that only upwardly mobile low-income families would have a place at Posadas Sentinel.
The poverty deconcentration strategy at Posadas Sentinel is not complete without an
understanding of who was served by this neighborhood-based dispersal of low income
households. The broader neighborhood has been served well as Posadas "looks better and feels
safer." Even market rate developers are comfortable building expensive market rate homes near
Posadas. Market rate homeowners and renters are now more willing to live near Posadas. The
residents that were able to come back to Posadas and those that are fortunate enough to get into
the development now are very well served with increased safety and focused attention from the
Community Services Department through the FSS program.
Despite all of these positive outcomes, there appears to be a strong echo of urban renewal themes
in the way that Posadas Sentinel was developed. Yes, the residents of Connie Chambers were
consulted and counseled for over a year. Yes, the residents of Connie Chambers voted for
Posadas Sentinel. Why then, were the very-low income, economically stagnant if not regressive,
most difficult to house public housing residents effectively removed from Posadas Sentinel
through strict screening policies and a requirement of participation in the Family Self Sufficiency
Program? In the end, these households had no choice but to leave their home at Connie
Chambers because the City believed that Connie Chambers housing needed a facelift and a
deconcentration of the most difficult sorts of poverty. Perhaps at the expense of those for whom
Posadas Sentinel was originally built (the original households of Connie Chambers) the City's
objectives of neighborhood revitalization and poverty deconcentration were achieved and have
had a positive, transformative effect on the broader Barrio Santa Rosa.
Chapter Three:
Mandela Gateway: HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration by Development-Based Poverty
Dilution
Poverty deconcentration at the Mandela Gateway HOPE VI development was achieved through a
strategy of development-based poverty dilution. This method of HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration is described as a replacing all of the former public housing onsite at the new
HOPE VI development while diluting the density of poverty by adding additional units for
households with higher incomes to the total unit mix.
At Mandela Gateway, this development-based poverty dilution is observed as all of the 46
original Westwood Gardens public housing units were replaced one for one, onsite. To do this,
the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) acquired two additional parcels abutting the original
Westwood Gardens site, one to the north and one to the east. The site to the north was acquired
as a surplus Caltrans property which remained from the collapse and subsequent removal of the
Cypress Freeway in 1989 following the Loma Prieta earthquake and the other parcel was used as
formerly a truck repair business. With an increased total development area, the OHA with
BRIDGE Housing as the developer, added 122 new affordable rental units for households up to
100% of area median income for a total 168 affordable units, including the 46 public housing
replacement units. The development also includes 20,000 square feet of retail space on the
ground floor.
Exhibit 13: Site Plan and Planning Area Map of Mandela Gateway
Policies and Ouestions of the Case
Mandela Gateway offers an exemplary case of onsite poverty dilution in a continuum of HOPE
VI poverty deconcentration strategies from 1993-2006. In very few instances have HOPE VI
developments been planned to increase the total number of affordable housing units while
replacing all of the former public housing onsite." Based on my survey of poverty
deconcentration policies for HOPE VI developments funded from FYl997-FY2004, the most
typical deconcentration method includes a reduction of total units, a reduction in public housing
replacement units, and a reduction of alternative units or vouchers for residents of the original
public housing. This is confirmed by Edward Goetz in his book Clearing the Way as he
characterizes this trend as "triple deconcentration."
" See Appendix A on page 111.
Fundamental to the OHA decision for development-based poverty dilution was the authority's
belief that higher incomes in a neighborhood would result in greater neighborhood
revitalization.4 s,46 Although Federal policy no longer requires one for one replacement of
demolished public housing units, the Board of Commissioners of the OHA enforced the one for
one public housing unit replacement rule. With the additional parcels and the small number of
replacement units (46), OHA decided to replace all of the units onsite, although scattered-site
dispersal was an option.
When this method of development-based poverty dilution is applied to the original research
question, "What are the implications of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration for broader
neighborhood revitalization?", it becomes clear that this question cannot be answered at Mandela
Gateway without lodging the poverty deconcentration strategy in a larger continuum of
redevelopment and social progress or regress in the greater West Oakland area, which follows in
a later section.
Compared to the neighborhood-based dispersal of poverty concentration used at Posadas
Sentinel, Mandela Gateway's development-based strategy does not include elements of scattered
site housing as replacement units. However, both Posadas Sentinel and Mandela Gateway may
claim the same results for neighborhood revitalization, despite the difference in poverty
deconcentration strategy at each site. As will be discussed in the coming pages, the poverty
deconcentration strategies used at Posadas and Mandela were part of a larger spectrum of policy
and program components that each respective housing authority employed through the HOPE VI
program to position the development as a catalyst for neighborhood transformation. While the
actors are different, the underlying economic and political dilemmas are different and the scale
of units is different, the housing authorities' sentiment that poverty deconcentration, whatever
the method, would be a key determining factor for broader neighborhood outcomes of
revitalization is evident in both cases.
45 Interview with Shad Smalls, 1/12/2006
46 Tucson also cited this reasoning for pursuing neighborhood-based dispersal.
The Subject Area: A Geographic Orientation
The two exhibits below indicate the geographic context and specific site location of Mandela
Gateway. It is clear from these maps that Mandela Gateway is situated in an area of residential
and industrial uses and is well connected to regional transportation networks through interstates
and the West Oakland BART Station.
Exhibit 14: Mandela Gateway Context Map
Exhibit 15: Site Plan of Mandela Gateway
Source: EIP Associates, BRIDGE Housing, 1999
Adapted by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
Su e Giarc Disens?
Why were HOPE VI funds pursued at Westwood Gardens?
Before launching into a description of the history and chronology of West Oakland and the
development of Mandela Gateway, it is useful to become familiar with the circumstances of
Westwood Gardens which made it a strong fit for a HOPE VI Revitalization grant.
Westwood Gardens was considered by the Oakland Housing Authority as severely distressed for
three reasons:
1) it was in considerable need of physical improvements
2) it was in need of management improvements (especially around tenant screening policies)
3) it was lacking in social and community services to meet the needs of its very low income
residents
Exhibit 16: Pictures of Westwood Gardens Public Housing
Pictures by: Jesse Wu
Westwood Gardens facing Mandela Parkway
Westwood Gardens at the intersection of 7 " and Center Streets.
The existing conditions at Westwood Gardens may be divided into three areas at which the
Mandela Gateway development was aimed to remedy. These areas include:
1) Physical Distress - Westwood Gardens occupied an entire 2.2 acre city block. The property
was originally built in the 1960s and consisted of four barracks-style buildings. This design was
out of context with the Victorian homes that dominate the single-family residential architecture
and style throughout most of West Oakland. This disparity in architectural style further
contributed to Westwood Gardens's residents' strong sense of isolation from their neighbors
(Oakland Housing Authority 1999:9). Before its demolition, the property also suffered from
severe obsolescence. The OHA states, "Poor design combined with both limited operating funds
and Federal preferences that fostered a concentration of the poorest of the poor have created the
conditions that now exist at Westwood Gardens." From this statement it is clear that the OHA
correlated physical distress of public housing with a concentration of the "poorest of the poor."
2) Demographic Distress - At the time of its application, Westwood Gardens and its
surrounding neighborhood was 93.5% non-white, approximately 80% African American and
10% Hispanic. 69.6% of all households with children were headed by a single parent. During
this same time, the labor force participation rate at Westwood Gardens was 12% compared to the
participation rate for Oakland overall at 63%4 Compared with adjacent census tracts with
unemployment rates between 4-6%, the unemployment rate at Westwood Gardens was 10%-12%
(Oakland Housing Authority 1999: 14). In the planning process for Mandela Gateway, local
residents, outside of the Westwood Gardens Development, voiced concerns about crime,
vandalism, drugs, and lack of services in the Westwood Gardens neighborhood. Whether true or
not, these residents of the broader West Oakland community associated the deterioration of their
neighborhood with Westwood Gardens and its concentration of poverty.
3) High Concentration of Poverty -- According to the OHA 1999 HOPE VI Revitalization Grant
Application and confirmed by interviews with public and private investors in West Oakland, the
high concentration of poverty in the neighborhood including Westwood Gardens public housing
47 The labor force participation rate at Westwood Gardens is the percent of households in the development that were
considered part of the labor force which means that the working age members in the household were able to work,
available for work and actively seeking employment.
added further to the negative perception of West Oakland as an undesirable and unsafe area in
which to live and discouraged investment. The OHA writes, "The high concentration of poverty
at Westwood Gardens adds further to the negative perception of West Oakland and this particular
neighborhood as an undesirable and unsafe area in which to live and discourages investment"
(Oakland Housing Authority 1999: 17). From this statement it is clear that the OHA relates a
high level of poverty in public housing with a perceived negative perception from the broader
community. See exhibit 17 below for a description of household incomes in the Mandela
Gateway study area.
Given these factors of severe social and physical deterioration, Westwood Gardens was
considered Oakland's most severely distressed public housing in 1999. While there were other
block style public housing developments in the Oakland public housing portfolio, the demolition
and revitalization of Westwood Gardens presented a unique opportunity for the OHA to
transform the community surrounding the HOPE VI development and add more units to their
portfolio. Therefore, not only was Westwood Gardens severely distressed housing, but its
redevelopment had the potential to meet the HUD goals of using HOPE VI dollars to transform a
broader community. With the redevelopment efforts that were already occurring around the
BART station, across the street, the redevelopment of Westwood was considered by the OHA,
Oakland city planners, and residents and business owners in West Oakland as a significant part
of the neighborhood-wide blight that was being tackled by a larger redevelopment effort begun
with the relocation of the Cypress Freeway after the Loma Prieta earthquake. The Oakland
Housing Authority wrote in the original Mandela Gateway HOPE VI application, "Without the
redevelopment, Westwood Gardens will continue as the anchor of blight in a community
desperate for change."
Exhibit 17: Average Annual Household Income per Census Tract
In each decade, the census tracts that contained Westwood Gardens and now Mandela Gateway have been in the quintile that represents the tracts with the
lowest annual average household income. The tracts around the Mandela Gateway Boundary have generally had household incomes between 10 and
nearly 300% more than the tracts containing Mandela Gateway. Therefore, the household incomes in the Mandela Gateway census tracts have been
historically lower than the surrounding tracts except in 1990, when there was some change in income and population due to the Loma Prieta earthquake
and subsequent removal of the Cypress Freeway.
Legend 1970
- Interstates
C Mandela Gateway Boundary
Percent of Tract with
Lowest Household Income
1.000-1.005
1.006 - 1.372
1.373 - 1.668
1.669 - 2.010
2.011 - 3.915
Census Tracts
Legend 1980
Percent of Tract with
Lowest Household Income
1.000 - 1.100
1.101 - 1.400
1.401 - 1.635
1.636 - 1.925
1.926 - 3.241
Legend 1990
Percent of Tract with
Lowest Household Income
1.000
1.001 - 1.399
1.400 - 1.929
1. 930 - 2.347
2.348 - 3.718
Legend 2000
Percent of Tract with
Lowest Household Income
1.000
1001 - 1.488
1.489 - 1.762
1.763 - 2.237
2.238 - 3.036
Exhibit 18: Map of Oakland Public Housing
Source: City of Oakland, Department of Housing and Community Development
Adapted by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
The map below shows the location of the traditional public housing developments in the OHA
portfolio.
Exhibit 19: Map of Assisted Rental Housing in Oakland
Source: City of Oakland, Department of Housing and Community Development
Adapted by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
Assisted Rental Housing in Oakland
as of April 2006
There is more Assisted Rental Housing in
West Oakland than other parts of Oakland.
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tenants are now screened out for the following characteristics: convicted felons, current tenants
with a record of violent acts, tenants with poor housekeeping habits, back-due rent or have
damages owed to OHA or other negative rental history, have been evicted from OHA or other
rental housing for cause, or other indicators of suspect behavior (Housing Authority of the City
of Oakland, California 1999: 59).
Who is served at Mandela Gateway?
Although the former Westwood Gardens residents had the first opportunity to return to Mandela
Gateway after it was constructed, only 13 of the original 46 Westwood Gardens households
returned. When asked why there was such a low return rate of these original residents, the
BRIDGE Housing project manager for Mandela Gateway stated that the Westwood Gardens
residents either found other housing or were not able to come back to the development because
of the more detailed screening policies. According to Jesse Wu, these screening policies were a
deterrent to the type of tenants that created an image and reality of poverty and distress at
Westwood Gardens.48
Further, the public housing eligible families that are living in Mandela Gateway now are vastly
different in terms of income levels, as most of these public housing families are working and
make close to 50% area median income, whereas residents of Westwood Gardens were at 30%
area median income or lower.49
Unlike the residents at Westwood Gardens, the public housing residents of Mandela Gateway are
largely expected, though not required, to focus on building personal assets and moving toward
self-sufficiency through participation in the Individual Development Account program and
subsequently the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program. According the Patricia Ison, Director
of Resident Services at the Oakland Housing Authority, for those 13 households that returned to
Mandela Gateway from Westwood Gardens, the expectation of participation in self-sufficiency
programming was new. The FSS program was not marketed for and rarely utilized by residents
at Westwood Gardens. However, despite new the expectation of participation in the FSS
program at Mandela Gateway, very few public housing residents at Mandela Gateway have
participated in the program. In fact, at the writing of this thesis only one household out of 46
had committed fully to the IDA and FSS programs with the end goal of acquiring a
homeownership unit at Mandela Gateway.
48 Interview with Jesse Wu, 3/27/2006
49 Interview with Patricia Ison, 4/25/2006
Funding
Mandela Gateway would not have been possible without the other leveraged funds that were
garnered through the original HOPE VI money. These funds helped to enhance the physical
landscape in West Oakland and helped to reweave traditional public housing in West Oakland
into the broader neighborhood. This leverage effect is catalytic because it demonstrates to other
public and private investors that there is demand for housing (and some retail) in the
neighborhood.
The City contributed a total of $3.5 million for the project including $1 million in HOME funds
and $2.5 million in funds from the City's redevelopment fund. This early commitment helped to
leverage other funds for the development such as a deferred fee contribution from the General
Partner, BRIDGE Housing. It is not clear whether the poverty deconcentration strategy and
mixed-income nature of Mandela Gateway made it more attractive to the City as it made a grant
to Mandela Gateway, as there is no formal policy at the City to prioritize housing developments
that deconcentrate poverty onsite. However, the mixed income nature of the project gave the
project more political and community support. The inclusion of the homeownership component
also served to increase support from Oakland's Mayor, City Council, and the Planning
Commission.5 0
The History and Chronolo2y of the Deterioration and Revitalization of Mandela Gateway
and the Greater West Oakland Area
As with Tucson's Posadas Sentinel, it is difficult to separate the spinoff effects from the Mandela
Gateway HOPE VI development from the already occurring investment interest in the West
Oakland area. What is more useful in this case, however, is to lodge the development of
Mandela Gateway in the continuum of revitalization and investment interest that was already
occurring in West Oakland before HOPE VI and is projected to continue after HOPE VI. The
placement in this continuum reveals that the development of Mandela Gateway, with its
development-based poverty dilution strategy, has played an important catalytic role in creating a
perception (and reality) of an area of Oakland that will reap positive returns for investors willing
50 Email from Jeffrey Levin, 4/15/2006
to take a risk on new residential and commercial development. It is important to place the
Mandela Gateway HOPE VI application in a discussion and description of West Oakland
planning reports because the early reports helped to pave the way for the programs and policies
of Mandela Gateway while later reports, after the HOPE VI Grant was received, helped to
integrate Mandela Gateway into broader neighborhood strategies for revitalization. The
assumption here is that that the demolition of Westwood Gardens and the subsequent
development of Mandela Gateway are interdependently related to underlying trends in public and
private investment and population demography in the broader West Oakland area.
Over 100 years ago, West Oakland was a major railroad terminus of the transcontinental railroad
after its completion in 1869. Later, the area would serve as a major WWII-era shipbuilding
center. As a result, a network of interstate freeways, industrial warehouses, and intermodal rail
yards comprise a major land use in West Oakland.
West Oakland was booming between 1911 and 1930 with a railroad and shipping economy that
lasted until the end of the Depression. To accommodate the government workers that were
employed in West Oakland's defense industries to support WWII, many of the area's block style
public housing projects were built. The idea was that the "small cottages and houses that had
defined West Oakland's neighborhoods were not fit living spaces for modem laborers and their
families." At the end of the 1930s, much of West Oakland was considered a slum by the City of
Oakland and houses were bulldozed. In 1941, a barracks-style public housing development
called Peralta Village was built for residents of these razed homes (Praetzellis et al. 2004: 31).
Soon thereafter, in the early 1950s, the electric railroad industry that originally built West
Oakland's industrial economy was in decline, as Oakland's extensive electric rails became
inefficient in an age of railroad technology that was quickly moving toward dieselization. As a
result, the West Oakland rail terminal was essentially shut down in 1950.
In 1957, the Cypress Freeway was built and significantly changed the character of West
Oakland development. The Cypress Freeway was originally designed as a connector between
the Bay Bridge and the Nimitz Freeway and was an elevated interstate that was placed right in
the middle of West Oakland. As a result, the West Oakland community was divided by a major
elevated freeway that served to further isolate West Oakland residents from the larger regional
economy of the Bay Area. This isolation would continue for nearly forty years.
Exhibit 20: 7 th Street Context Before and After the Collapse and Relocation of the Cypress
Freeway.
Cypress Freeway
1971
2003
Westwood Gardens
Mandela Parkway
In an effort to try and serve West Oakland's economically and spatially marginalized residents,
the City of Oakland began to focus on West Oakland through inclusive planning efforts with the
aim of reintegrating forgotten areas of the city back into Oakland's mainstream economy. This
was taken on by the City's planning department in the late 1960s and early 70s. Specific to the
development of the West Oakland landscape, Oakland planners allowed a large U.S. Post Office
facility to come into the neighborhood and in 1974, built a new BART station up 7th Street (West
Oakland BART Station). The Post Office destroyed six blocks of single family homes and the
BART Station and its parking lot cleared several more residential blocks.51 Both developments
were largely out of scale and use-type for West Oakland at the time of their construction when
most of West Oakland consisted of light industrial uses and single family homes. Many of the
residents of West Oakland viewed this planning of the Post Office and the BART Station as an
51 Much of this history of West Oakland was adapted from Praetzellis, et al. 2004 and interviews with West Oakland
residents.
"assault on the remaining integrity of the historic Seventh Street corridor" (Praetzellis et al 2004:
46).
As a result of this community distrust of Oakland's City Planning Department and lack of
community involvement in the planning of the BART Station and other City imposed land uses,
many planning studies on West Oakland since the 1974 BART opening have found that the West
Oakland BART had never really ever been a community amenity for West Oakland residents.
The idea of tying the BART Station back into the community in which it was placed in 1974 was
a critical element of the Mandela Gateway development as the OHA and BRIDGE Housing
sought to link the BART Station commuters to the development by developing retail space on
the first floor. It was hoped that BART Commuters would use the retail space to buy goods and
services. Also, it was hoped by BRIDGE that Mandela Gateway would be developed in a way
that enabled its residents to use the BART Station as a means to greater economic mobility and
self-sufficiency (Mandela Gateway Gardens Associates 2001).
This debate around the usefulness and integration of the BART Station into West Oakland was a
cornerstone of the Mandela Gateway development plan. As Mandela Gateway is located directly
adjacent to the BART Station, the redevelopment of Westwood Gardens into Mandela Gateway
was key to changing this neighborhood perception of crime as the Mandela Gateway
development presented a positive visual announcement of the West Oakland neighborhood to
BART passengers.
In 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake caused the Cypress Freeway, built in 1957 through West
Oakland, to collapse. The neighborhoods around this Freeway began to organize and fight to
have the replaced Freeway be developed outside of the residential neighborhood which it had
divided since 1957. This organizational effort from the residents represented one of the first
public efforts of West Oakland community members to influence public decisions affecting the
neighborhood's future (Van Meter Williams Pollock 1998). As a result, the 1-880/1-80 link (the
former Cypress Freeway) was relocated away from the neighborhood. Since the removal of the
Cypress Freeway, West Oakland is now well connected to downtown Oakland and Jack London
square, which creates higher market demand for residential uses in West Oakland (Hood Design
et. al. 2004).
This resident response that resulted in the relocation of the Cypress Freeway was the start of a
concerted effort on behalf of the City of Oakland, BART, and West Oakland residents and
business owners to revitalize West Oakland. The redevelopment of Westwood Gardens is a key
component to this chronology of planning efforts for the area, and is in fact one of the very few
planning goals from these reports that have actually been implemented.
In April of 1997, a concept plan for the former Cypress Freeway corridor was developed by a
private firm (with resident and business owner support) for the City's Economic Development
Agency for use in working with CalTrans (California's Transportation Authority) to determine
the appropriate use and disposition of surplus properties created by the collapse of the Cypress
Freeway. These properties would later be critical to the Mandela Gateway development as one
of the CalTrans surplus parcels was used for the development (Mandela Parkway Corridor Plan:
1997). The following year, the Mandela Parkway Corridor Plan was developed to establish a
design vision and program of improvements for the former Cypress Freeway Corridor (Mandela
Parkway Corridor Plan: 1998). These two studies are important to the co-evolution of West
Oakland and Mandela Gateway because they indicate the priority of revitalizing the former
Cypress Freeway area (right where Mandela Gateway is now located), and describe a strategy of
visually reducing blight detriment through landscaping and increased elements of pedestrian
accessibility. Both of these planning goals were embodied in the Mandela Gateway development
as the demolition of Westwood Gardens was a major step in reducing visual blight along 7 th
Avenue and the landscaping of Mandela Gateway was conceived of and developed to be
pedestrian friendly.
Further indicating the City's support of Transit Oriented Development such as the Mandela
Gateway development, in March of 1998, Oakland adopted the General Plan Land Use and
Transportation Element (LUTE) which articulated the City's policy direction toward Transit
Oriented Development and called for the integration of land use and transportation in mixed-use
districts programmed for Oakland's eight BART Stations, including the West Oakland Station.
This study happened one year prior to the Mandela Gateway HOPE VI application and receipt of
the demolition and revitalization grant. As Mandela Gateway is directly across from BART, the
HOPE VI application reflected the City's Transit Oriented Development (TOD) policy direction
which was critical for the City's support of the project. The TOD nature of the Mandela Gateway
development is in line with this policy direction. In fact, the ground floor retail at Mandela was a
direct requirement from the City planning commission in an effort to create a transit village at
the West Oakland BART Station.
In 1999, the Oakland Housing Authority applied for HOPE VI funds to demolish Westwood
Gardens and build Mandela Gateway. According to the original HOPE VI grant application for
Mandela Gateway in 1999, there was already occurring a "tremendous upsurge in investment
activities planned and underway in West Oakland" around the former Westwood Gardens site.
The OHA approached this as a trend that would not only complement the HOPE VI plan for
Mandela Gateway, but would also "reinforce its potential for successful and expeditious
implementation" (Housing Authority of the City of Oakland, California 1999: 53).
Mandela Gateway was positioned and planned as a transit oriented development with mixed-use,
mixed income features to capture the promising residential and commercial market potential of
the surrounding West Oakland community. An overriding element of this development-based
poverty deconcentration strategy is its origin in the belief of many community and City
stakeholders that Mandela Gateway was a unique opportunity to make a difference in the
revitalization of West Oakland. The community goals realized at Mandela Gateway included:
preventing the displacement of current residents; increasing homeownership opportunities;
increasing the supply of quality affordable housing with supportive services; and enhancing
mixed income housing (Housing Authority of the City of Oakland, California 1999: 38).
Reflected in the application and demonstrated onsite at Mandela is the City's TOD policy
direction and the sentiment of the West Oakland residents and business owners that rallied
together to move the Cypress Freeway out of their neighborhood. The application included plans
for mixed-uses and mixed-incomes. As the Mandela Gateway HOPE VI application was being
developed, the OHA was participating in the Acorn Prescott Neighborhood Transportation Plan
which was focused on the mapping and evaluation of existing conditions regarding transit
accessibility in the Acorn Prescott Neighborhood, which is where Mandela Gateway was
developed.
This Acorn Prescott Neighborhood Transportation Plan presents an overview of public area
improvement needs for the neighborhood in which Mandela Gateway is placed and identifies
needed streetscape and pedestrian improvements that would directly impact the development of
Mandela Gateway. The OHA included many of these planning recommendations in their HOPE
VI application.
Following the 1999 HOPE VI Grant to Mandela Gateway, the 2001 West Oakland Transit
Village Action Report was published. This important planning document describes the
development of a number of opportunity and catalyst sites in the project area bounded by Wood,
Eighth, Union and Third streets. This is the first report for West Oakland that strategically laid
out a comprehensive development plan for the area that would include elements of housing,
economic development, and transit oriented development. One of the key catalyst projects listed
in this report was Mandela Gateway. The OHA worked with the planning group on this
document for over one year to discuss plans for not only their site, but the development in the
broader neighborhood to ensure that Mandela Gateway would be integrated into the other
planning activities happening in the neighborhood. To date, implementation outcomes of this
report include the development of Mandela Gateway, a completed streetscape plan for the
Seventh Street corridor, and the release of a BART Request for Proposal for the development of
52its property surrounding the BART station. The end goal of the plan is to create a Transit
Village in West Oakland, of which Mandela Gateway is a critical component. Shad Smalls, the
Mandela Gateway project manager at OHA stated, "The Transit Village study led to zoning
changes that created an overlay district for mixed-uses (residential and commercial) and higher
density of units that helped to ensure that Mandela Gateway would be integrated into the larger
West Oakland neighborhood."5 3
5 2 http://www.business2oakland.com/main/westoakiand.htm#Map on 4/19/2006
5 Interview with Shad Smalls, 3/27/2006
Staff of the OHA and BRIDGE Housing sat side by side with other planners as the transportation
and street grid infrastructure were put together for the neighborhood. The OHA writes in the
HOPE VI revitalization grant, "This rich transportation network is central to the neighborhood's
potential HOPE VI employment linkages" (Housing Authority of the City of Oakland, California
1999: 12). Phil Neville, Executive Director of the OHA states, "We (OHA) wanted to build
Mandela Gateway using the magnet of the BART station to attract capital for the project and
retail tenants."5 4
Perhaps one of the most critical West Oakland planning initiatives in the last five years is the
West Oakland Redevelopment Plan (2003). The development of Mandela Gateway played a
significant role in this plan which includes goals that are realized at the HOPE VI development.
Specific goals with Mandela Gateway-related achievements include:
e Goal: Restore blighted properties in the Project Area
Achievement: The former Westwood Gardens public housing was a major fixture
of visual blight along the 7 th Street Corridor and a pocket of concentrated poverty.
Its demolition and redevelopment was a significant restoration of blighted
property in the West Oakland project area.
* Increase opportunities for homeownership in the Project Area
Achievement: The Mandela Gateway development includes nine homeownership
units for public housing residents and 10 homeownership units for market rate
tenants. At the writing of this thesis, these units had yet to break ground.
" Maintain and improve the condition of the existing affordable housing the Project Area
Achievement: By replacing all of the public housing units that were originally at
Westwood Gardens onsite at Mandela Gateway, the condition of these units was
significantly improved and the operating budget and maintenance policies of the
new units will ensure proper maintenance of these units.
54 Interview with Phil Neville, 1/10/2006
" Improve the quality of housing by assisting new construction, rehabilitation, and
conservation of living units in the Project Area
Achievement: Mandela Gateway meets this goal by conserving affordable
housing and constructing 122 new units
" Construct affordable housing in smaller, infill projects, on scattered sites, and/or in
mixed-income developments'. Do not concentrate affordable housing or develop stand-
alone, high density affordable housing projects
Achievement: Mandela Gateway includes units for a variety of household
incomes from 30% AMI to 100% AMI.
The realization of these goals by the OHA and their manifestation in the development of
Mandela Gateway indicates a mutual agreement between the City, residents and business owners
of West Oakland, developers interested in developing in West Oakland, and the OHA around
integration of Mandela Gateway into the broader West Oakland continuum of redevelopment.
Since the initial 1999 HOPE VI grant award, Westwood Gardens was demolished in April of
2002. According to the development schedule for the project, construction and lease up for
Mandela Gateway finished in October of 2003. The retail component of the development has
remained unleased since its projected completion in October of 2003.
Now that Mandela Gateway is fully built out, with the exception of the homeownership units, the
development is placed in plans for West Oakland as a cornerstone feature around which future
planning recommendations are shaped. For example, the 2004 Seventh Street Concept and
Urban Design Plan recommends amenities for future transit oriented development that creates a
"place" identity along Seventh Street. The development of Mandela Gateway as a mixed-use
development was critical element in these recommendations of place and progress along the
seventh-street corridor.
The Redevelopment Debates of West Oakland: Underlying policy and economic Dilemmas
in the co-evolution of West Oakland, Westwood Gardens, and the broader West Oakland
neighborhood.
The development and use of land in West Oakland between residential and industrial mix has
created a major political and policy debate around whether the future use of the West Oakland
should preserve the industrial character of the area or meet the ever escalating and fever-pitched
demand for housing in the Bay Area. While many of West Oakland's industrial uses of the area
pre-date the residential development, less heavy industry is occurring in West Oakland as these
manufacturing jobs have moved overseas (Mundie & Associates 2005: 6).
As the definition for highest and best land use in West Oakland was and is under hot political
debate, Mandela Gateway, with its 168 units of affordable rental and homeownership units, was
one of the first residential developments in the area directly across the street from many of these
industrial and port uses (See Exhibit 21 below).
Exhibit 21: Land Use Map Surrounding Mandela Gateway
West Oakland Land Use, 2006
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Map by: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
Source: Oakland Community and Economic Development Agency, 2006.
As the land use map indicates, there is a heavy mixture of
industrial and residential land uses around Mandela Gateway.
More development is planned for the "business mix" use area
for mixed residential-commercial uses.UU
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The revitalization benefits realized from the mixed-income nature of Mandela Gateway can be
seen as the development is placed in the larger continuum of planning and development efforts in
the West Oakland area, as demonstrated in the previous section. By pursuing a policy of
development-based poverty dilution, the Oakland Housing Authority achieved a preservation of
public housing units in the area while leveraging funds to create more affordable housing for
slightly higher income households. They leveraged more than just money, but also the political
interest in the revitalization of the area and the commitment from the community to take a
progressive and activist role in the way West Oakland would be developed, begun with the
community's efforts to relocate the Cypress Freeway. Out of this political and community
interest in the redevelopment of West Oakland spring two key dilemmas that were answered by
the Mandela Gateway development
1) On the one hand, residents from outside of Westwood Gardens complained that
West Oakland already had too much subsidized housing. On the other hand,
residents were worried that if new housing were built (other than affordable
housing), gentrification would occur and residents would no longer be able to pay
the taxes on their homes and would be forced to leave West Oakland. This sentiment
is evidenced by the large turnout of local residents, outside of Westwood Gardens, at the
community meetings to plan for Mandela Gateway. Neighborhood groups involved in
the planning process included the Coalition for West Oakland Revitalization (CWOR),
The Alliance for West Oakland Development, and the 7 th Street/McClymonds Initiative.
55,56
" CWOR is a non-profit community advocacy organization formed in 1992 to fight for environmental justice rights,
racial and cultural equity, a strong community-based economy, and improved physical and social conditions for
West Oakland residents. CWOR accomplishes this broad-based mission by operating through its Coalition of
residents, property owners, business, non-profit and community based organizations, churches and public and
private entities. (From: "Clearing the Air: Reducing Diesel Pollution in West Oakland.")
56 The Alliance for West Oakland Development (the "Alliance") is a 501(c) (3) non-profit community
redevelopment corporation founded in 1999. The mission of the Alliance is to initiate, promote, and facilitate the
development of blighted residential and commercial districts in West Oakland, California, boosting opportunities for
long-time residents, and preserving the cultural roots of the area. The Alliance is working to build and enhance
existing relationships between the participating organizations and the City of Oakland, the community at large, and
community, regional organization and institutions that have an interest in rebuilding West Oakland through a
community-based planning process. (From: www.awod.org)
There is some merit to both sides of this debate. An investigation of historical assessed
property values shows that property values in West Oakland have indeed escalated
tremendously since 2000.57 And, as the maps in Appendix 0 show, there is a high amount
of subsidized housing in West Oakland relative to the rest of Oakland. The development-
based poverty deconcentration strategy at Mandela Gateway preserves public housing
units in a neighborhood where there is already a high concentration of households in
poverty. 58
To answer this debate, the OHA convinced the community that the addition of more
affordable housing in a high-poverty neighborhood would not add to the stigma of crime
and disinvestment in West Oakland because the Mandela Gateway tenants would be
subject to stricter screening than the screening of the residents at Westwood Gardens.
The community, including residents and business owners outside of Westwood Gardens,
voiced a wish for more homeownership opportunities in the neighborhood. This
sentiment was voiced at the Mandela Gateway community planning meetings and is
evidenced in the myriad plans that have been developed to address redevelopment in
West Oakland (see history and chronology section above). Additionally, the OHA has
set aside nine homeownership units for households in public housing units. Ten
homeownership units will be built for market-rate tenants. Given the opportunity to
become homeowners, it was believed by the OHA staff and the BRIDGE Housing staff
(the developer of Mandela Gateway) that public housing renters onsite would perhaps
"aspire" to be homeowners, thus causing them to take more pride in their rental units and
be particularly mindful of the development's rules and regulations. The idea was that if
homeownership was within reach to public housing renters, then there would be greater
pride and care taken of the rental units. 59
57 See Appendix F for a description of escalating property values for single family homes surrounding Mandela
Gateway.
58 See Exhibit 17 for a comparison map of household incomes per census tract in and around Mandela Gateway.
59 This has yet to be tested at the writing of this thesis, as the homeownership units are projected to begin
construction in late Spring 2006.
2) Commercial Land Use vs. Residential Use. This plan balances the political and
economic pressures of preserving and expanding the commercial and industrial character
of the West Oakland economy while providing affordable housing in a market where
there is very little existing affordable housing stock. On the one hand, there was
political support to preserve the light industrial character and former commercial
character of Seventh street of the area while there was similar political support to
produce more affordable housing to avert the "affordability crisis" that continues to
characterize the region. As the Mandela Gateway development is a major fixture in the
City-sponsored West Oakland Redevelopment Plan, it provides for affordable
housing while offering retail space (although it has yet to be filled). This mixed use
plan addresses both economic development and housing needs in West Oakland.
Capturing the Effect of Poverty Deconcentration on the Broader Neighborhood: Realities
and Perceptions of the Implication of Development-based Poverty Deconcentration
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, capturing the implications of poverty deconcentration in
HOPE VI developments for broader neighborhood revitalization is difficult to quantify and
measure fully. In the case of Mandela Gateway, I had the opportunity to interview public and
private investors near the HOPE VI site to hear their perspectives about the impact of poverty
deconcentration on their investment activity.
Aegis Realty, which is developing large parcels across the street from the Mandela Gateway
project for market rate rental residential use, describes Mandela Gateway as a development that
clearly looks nicer and safer than the former Westwood Gardens. However, while a key
informant with Aegis Realty is glad that Westwood Gardens has been revitalized, she does not
think that Mandela Gateway was a catalyst in her firm's decision to invest in West Oakland. The
underlying trends of cheap, available, developable land coupled with the great access on the
BART station were the most important indicators of whether the firm's planned residential
development would be profitable in West Oakland. Other than the fact that Mandela Gateway
"looks nicer", the firm's interaction with the development has been minimal. Additionally, the
development of Mandela Gateway had very little influence in the timeline for Aegis'
development activity in West Oakland.
The Aegis reprentative stated that the developer understands clearly the high density of poverty
in the West Oakland neighborhood, but believes that the demand for rental and homeownership
units near the West Oakland BART station will be attractive to buyers, even though the area
continues to have a perception of high crime and high poverty. Given the shortage of housing in
the Bay Area, buyers are willing to look at West Oakland. Aegis is developing its units in a way
that gives a strong impression of safety with wrought iron fences around the perimeter of the
development.
Peter Sullivan Associates, Inc. is planning a mixed use/mixed occupancy project that will contain
residential, industrial, and commercial activities in a cluster of buildings on the project site. This
site is just a few blocks east of Mandela Gateway at the corner of Mandela Parkway and Grand
Avenue. The site currently contains two industrial buildings, one of which will be demolished
while the other will be retained and rehabilitated. The project proposes approximately 1,575
dwelling units and 212,000 square feet of commercial/retail/custom and light industrial use.
These dwelling units will be a mix of rental and homeownership opportunities. The number and
level of affordable units has yet to be determined.
A project manager with Peter Sullivan states that the firm's initial reason for pursuing
development in West Oakland, specifically at Grand and Mandela Parkway, was its great
location. The site's proximity to the Bay Bridge, major interstates, two BART stations
(MacArthur and West Oakland), and downtown Oakland and Emeryville was very appealing to
the developer.
He cites a substantial visual change in the streetscaping and redevelopment of Mandela Parkway
as a significant element in the redevelopment of West Oakland. He notes, "Everytime you drive
down Mandela Parkway you can see the blight, but you can also see the possibility for
revitalization."
The concentration of public housing in West Oakland has been a factor in the development
program for this project, known as the Mandela Grand Mixed Used Redevelopment Project.
Initially, the developer had hoped to include a big box retailer in their development. However,
according to the project manager, with the high rate of poverty in the neighborhood, these
retailers were reluctant to move into the site. Many of these potential retailers expressed
concerns about the household income levels in the neighborhood.
The project manager points to some signs that show revitalization in the neighborhood including
the purchase of abandoned industrial sites by residential developers and also the development
around BART and the redevelopment of Westwood Gardens.
I spoke with Philip Banta, the lead architect on the redevelopment of the Red Star Yeast plant at
1396 5th Street, across from Mandela Gateway. This project includes 119 for-sale condo units
and 850 s.f. of commercial space.
Banta described many signals that show that West Oakland is an attractive place to invest and
development residential properties. He states, "There are a lot of projects which are now being
proposed, mostly residential, a new faith in the area which hasn't happened until now." He too
cites West Oakland's location and proximity to San Francisco as one of the area's greatest assets
in terms of residential development.
Still, he notes, there is still a strong perception and about crime in the West Oakland area. He
confirms that a large part of the resident population in West Oakland is in the "lower economic
brackets." Even today, he believes that if you were in West Oakland in the wrong place, in the
wrong time of day you could be mugged. However, buyers are still willing to put down
$400,000-$500,000 for a single family home in West Oakland. According to Mr. Banta, buyers
are willing to live in West Oakland because they are do not want to move out of the Bay Area
and be distant from the cultural assets of the city and jobs. He states, "Buyers and renters are
essentially sticking their head in the sand about the crime in West Oakland." However, he
repeats the sentiment that West Oakland market rate residents, outside of subsidized housing, are
not thrilled about having subsidized housing in the neighborhood. He does agree that Mandela
Gateway looks nicer and has really cleaned up some of the visual blight in the area.
Mr. Banta believes that in 20 years, the density of West Oakland will increase and there will be
more residential, commercial, and ultralight industrial uses in the area. It is clear from this
interview that the poverty deconcentration at Mandela Gateway did contribute to the look and
feel of the neighborhood around the BART station, but that the demand for development at West
Oakland was more about the tight housing conditions in the Bay Area. West Oakland will offer
an option for young professionals or small families to live in the Bay Area.
Causality: Development and Poverty Deconcentration. Are they related in West Oakland?
Is it true that the development Mandela Gateway has served to catalyze the surrounding
neighborhood, specifically through its element of development-based poverty deconcentration?
It depends upon who is responding to the question. The planners and economic development
practitioners or the staff at the Oakland Housing Authority would answer that Mandela Gateway
has been a signal to the broader neighborhood and its potential investors that West Oakland is a
good place to invest. Private developers would say nothing of the development-based poverty
deconcentration strategy at Mandela Gateway, though they would likely mention that it makes
the area look nicer and feel safer.
However, the fact that Mandela Gateway "looks nicer" has not been enough of an argument to
get tenants to fill the ground floor retail included in the development. As Mandela Gateway was
being built, Walgreens was courted as a potential anchor tenant for the retail component. After
much negotiation and debate between Mandela's developer and the Real Estate staff for
Walgreens, the company decided that the demographic of West Oakland could not support their
store. This demographic indicators of interest to Walgreens included trends such as low
household income and high crime.
While it is true the Mandela Gateway has served to remedy the visual blight that once plagued
Westwood Gardens and its surrounds, it is not entirely clear what development-based poverty
deconcentration had to do with this "visual improvement." In this case, it may be as simple as
the OHA following a very clear edict from their Board of Commissioners to replace every public
housing unit that is demolished. In this case, the scale of Westwood Gardens, with only 46
public housing units, allowed these units to be replaced onsite while 122 units for households at
higher incomes were added.
Without the mixed-income program at Mandela Gateway, the development simply would not
have been possible. The mixed-income component is key to Mandela Gateway because of the
high per-unit cost to develop affordable housing at deep subsidies, for households below 50%
area median income. The cash flow from higher-rent units serves to subsidize the lower rent
units. According to Jesse Wu, Mandela Gateway project manager at BRIDGE Housing, "The
HOPE VI grant paid for the early expenses of the site and gave legitimacy to the project with the
City and the community. Without other designated funds from state and city sources, the HOPE
VI development would not be possible." At Mandela Gateway, transportation improvements, the
development of retail space, and the inclusion of homeownership units were some of these
benefits that will hopefully be realized soon through leveraged funds, beyond the original HOPE
VI grant.
Although the retail component of Mandela Gateway remains unrented today, the development of
this retail space shows that perhaps the housing authority was one step ahead of the market.
Conversations with other developers confirm that the area is ripe for commercial and residential
investment. These conversations also confirm that the amount of poverty in the area contributes
significantly to the retail or commercial tenant's willingness to move into the area. As more
units are planned and developed for market rate residents, the demand for retail will increase and
these commercial tenants will be more willing to move into the neighborhood. Mandela's retail
space will be used, but the market is not ready for it just yet. There are some leases that are
tentatively signed, but overall, the market is not yet ready to take a leap of faith and invest in
such an impoverished area of Oakland.
One may wonder how and to what scale neighborhood revitalization could be affected by
essentially giving 46 public housing residents some less-poor neighbors, especially given the
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high poverty levels that exist in West Oakland. It is difficult to correlate a change in poverty
levels with the deconcentration of poverty at Westwood Gardens given its small scale. This
policy of development-based poverty dilution at Westwood Gardens has served to increase the
number of non-public housing units (albeit still subsidized) in the neighborhood, has offered
affordable homeownership opportunities in a neighborhood that is characteristically a rental
neighborhood, and has included the first new retail space for commercial tenants in the
neighborhood.60
Carol Galante, President and CEO of BRIDGE Housing commented in Affordable Housing
Finance, "One of the big lessons that Mandela Gateway teaches is that a project needs to be done
on a large enough scale to make an impact on a neighborhood in need of economic
revitalization." Compared to the projects described above at 1600 units, the 168 units at
Mandela Gateway hardly seem to be large enough in scale to make a real impact on economic
revitalization, especially since the retail component of the development has been empty since
April of 2003.
But, despite its small scale compared to private development happening in the broader
neighborhood, what would happen if there was no Mandela Gateway? For one thing, the visual
blight of Westwood Gardens would remain. As a result, there would probably be less buyer
demand for the condominium market in West Oakland and there would be no opportunity for
new commercial tenants to come into 7th Street. As the West Oakland Transit Study found,
"West Oakland, will continue for some time to be seen as a high risk place for reinvestment. The
fact that OHA is in a position through the HOPE VI grant to provide public reinvestment in a
critical new housing development, Mandela Gateway, provides a critical catalyst for change."
(37).
The response from the developer of Mandela Gateway, BRIDGE Housing, is that "It is not
HOPE VI itself that revitalizes the neighborhoods, but the elements demanded by the proposal
including Low Income Housing Tax Credits, Section 8, City Money and others that come
together to create a collaborative plan for neighborhood revitalization." 61 One might conclude,
60 See Appendix G for an analysis of rental vs. ownership tenure for single family homes in West Oakland.
61 Interview with Jess Wu, 1/13/2006
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therefore, that it is the catalyzing effect of HOPE VI to bring more investment to the
neighborhood in terms of serving other demographic strata that causes the perceived and
assumed spillover revitalization effects of poverty deconcentration at the HOPE VI site.
The institutional investment that happened concurrently as Mandela was being developed came
together as the City of Oakland prioritized this project because there was a lot of blight in the
area and the City's leadership saw it as an opportunity to signal to the market that West Oakland
was a place to invest. Plus, it fit well into the Mayor's preservation and creation of affordable
housing goals. This institutional investment, including improved streetscape and funded Transit
Oriented Development studies, is an example of increased amenities that were provided for
people beyond the Mandela Gateway development, but could have been catalyzed by the HOPE
VI funds.
Where does development-based poverty dilution fit into this catalyzation of the broader
neighborhood? Based on this research, it doesn't. The agenda of preserving all demolished
public housing units was a public policy priority of the OHA that was easily done at Mandela
Gateway due to the small number of units that were to be replaced onsite (only 46). Further, due
to new management policies, the poor that once lived at Westwood Gardens have all but
disappeared from Mandela Gateway, as only 13 of the original 46 Westwood Gardens
households returned.
While admirable and certainly exceptional among the full spectrum of deconcentration strategies
in HOPE VI developments, this strategy of development-based poverty dilution has barely
registered on the screens of public and private investors that have some understanding of or
connection with Mandela Gateway. Why? Perhaps because market rate housing demand, which
these developers are mostly concerned with, has nothing do with how much public housing is in
West Oakland, diluted of poverty or not. The reality is that as market rate housing prices
continue to escalate in the Bay Area, West Oakland will be developed rapidly as it is one of the
few thresholds of available, developable land left. At least there are now 168 units of decently
managed, decently mixed, decently designed affordable housing at Mandela Gateway to preserve
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some affordability for those that can manage to successfully pass the screening criteria and
obtain a unit at Mandela Gateway as the rest West Oakland is built out with market rate housing.
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Chapter 4:
Conclusion and a Research Agenda
This thesis is an investigation of the implications of two widely-practiced HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration methods for broader neighborhood revitalization. The two types of
deconcentration investigated were "development-based poverty dilution" at Oakland's Mandela
Gateway and "neighborhood-based dispersal" at Tucson's Posadas Sentinel. In both cases, the
units of analysis included the type of poverty deconcentration used and the outcome(s) for
neighborhood revitalization related to each case's method of poverty deconcentration at the
HOPE VI site. This was measured both in terms of increased public and private investment in
the near block groups containing the HOPE VI development and also the historical poverty and
median home values in these tracts. Additionally, the history of the relationship between
development (residential, commercial, public infrastructure) and poverty in the subject census
tract and surrounding tracts is described alongside the underlying political and economic trends
affecting or affected by the subject neighborhood.
Is poverty deconcentration as a tool for neighborhood revitalization really just common sense? It
seems fairly reasonable for one to assume that a neighborhood would revitalize if there were less
concentrated poverty in the area. The theories and studies of poverty deconcentration (related in
the chapter two literature review) all conclude that in areas of lower poverty, residents on the
lower end of the economic spectrum have opportunities to realize greater economic mobility and
self-sufficiency if they have less poor neighbors. According to this literature, when poor people
are next to less-poor people, public and private neighborhood amenities increase, the opportunity
to create and engage in social capital is intensified, and there is a greater chance that a variety of
skilled workforce-ready households will find employment. This thesis aimed to take this theory
one step further and investigate investment behavior in neighborhoods surrounding HOPE VI
developments where poverty has been deconcentrated through methods of dispersal or dilution of
public housing residents.
Although two methods of poverty deconcentration were studied in this thesis, it is beyond the
scope of these conclusions to determine which method, either neighborhood-based dispersion or
development-based dilution, has the greater implication for broader neighborhood revitalization.
104
The relevant conclusion, however, is that at both the Mandela Gateway and Posadas Sentinel
HOPE VI developments the respective housing authorities developed their deconcentration
strategy to meet the conditions of the market trends in the broader neighborhood while
maintaining their HUD and City prescribed mandates for production and long-term preservation
of affordable housing - including public housing. The interesting aspect of this research and the
related conclusions is the answer as to why a public housing authority would chose one strategy
for poverty deconcentration over another and what implications that choice has for the broader
neighborhood investment and revitalization. The origins and impact of these two contrasting
HOPE VI poverty deconcentration strategies are key, especially when placed in a continuum of
underlying neighborhood revitalization or disinvestment trends in the neighborhood surrounding
the HOPE VI development.
Determinin2 Causality: What does poverty deconcentration at Mandela Gateway and
Posadas Sentinel really mean for investment decisions for broader neighborhood
revitalization?
Causality between investment behavior and the type of poverty deconcentration at the two HOPE
VI developments evaluated in this thesis has been determined largely by personal interviews of
market actors around the HOPE VI development and some historical evaluations of land use,
household income, and median home value over time. This data show that private residential
investors around the HOPE VI development have very little interest or concern about how much
poverty remains at the redeveloped housing. Over and over, these investors mentioned, "Well, it
looks nicer and it feels safer." The quantitative data shows an increase in home values and
median household income. However, is this idea of revitalizing distressed public housing by
making it "look nicer and feel safer" really a signal to the market that the broader neighborhood
is now "revitalized"?
It is not clear whether changing the management at the housing from the housing authority to a
private property management company and upgrading the appearance of the HOPE VI
development would yield the same investment behavior from residential investors. It is clear,
however, that commercial investors look very seriously at the demographic of a neighborhood
before they will commit to investment. At Mandela Gateway, the retail space connected with the
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development remains empty nearly two years after it was built. Potential commercial tenants
cite reasons like "not enough rooftops in the area", "too much risk of merchandise 'shrinkage'",
and "not a high enough income population to support the store." For these investors, the HOPE
VI revitalization was not enough to deconcentrate poverty in a way that would make it
financially feasible for them to invest. Other factors, perhaps beyond the housing development
itself, would have to change.
The same is true for Posadas Sentinel in Tucson. Here, small businesses along one of the HOPE
VI neighborhood's peripheral boundaries still cite concerns about crime and lack of demand for
their product as major barriers to their entry to the market. This is related to both the high level
of poverty that remains in the neighborhood and the fact that residents in the Barrio Santa Rosa
are willing to drive elsewhere to buy their needed goods and services. Despite the economic
development planning efforts that were undertaken as part of the Posadas Sentinel HOPE VI
revitalization grant, new commercial uses have not moved into the neighborhood along 6th
Avenue.
Both cases evaluated in this thesis reveal a stark inadequacy of HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration strategies to affect poverty levels in the broader neighborhood. As described
with census data and maps, both Posadas Sentinel and Mandela Gateway are placed in
neighborhoods where high poverty levels extend beyond the HOPE VI development and into the
surrounding census block groups. While poverty has been deconcentrated at the actual
development, it does not appear that this deconcentration goes beyond the bounds of the
development. That is, despite the deconcentration onsite at Posadas and Mandela, the HOPE VI
development is still placed in a low-income neighborhood. This fact causes some questions to
arise about the underlying theory behind HOPE VI poverty deconcentration. As detailed in the
literature review and background sections of this thesis, households in neighborhoods with lower
poverty are supposedly economically, socially, and politically healthier than households in
neighborhoods of high, concentrated poverty.
Given the scale and type of poverty deconcentration implemented at Posadas Sentinel and
Mandela Gateway, it is not clear that the decrease in poverty density at these developments had
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any impact on broader neighborhood level poverty. This begs the question about whether is it
really HOPE VI poverty deconcentration that spurs investment and transformation in the broader
neighborhood. Could it be the physical, economic, social, and political isolation of the broader
neighborhood that prevents investment?
Finally, these two cases demonstrate that poverty deconcentration strategies of neighborhood-
based dispersal and development-based dilution have very little or no impact on the root causes
of poverty that caused the initial disintegration of the replaced severely distressed public
housing. Instead, these strategies are aimed at changing the type of visible poverty onsite, as
most of the original public housing families do not return to the HOPE VI development.
Without addressing the root of poverty at these severely distressed public housing developments,
what sort of transformative neighborhood impact could be expected from HOPE VI poverty
deconcentration strategies? At Posadas Sentinel and Mandela Gateway, the answer is, "Very
little."
Best Practices to Advance the Critical Goals of HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration
1. Coordination and partnership with public and private investors in the broader
neighborhood. In both Posadas Sentinel and Mandela Gateway, the administrative housing
authority made an early commitment that the HOPE VI development would be about more than
developing high quality affordable housing. The HOPE VI developments in both cases aimed to
be key participants in and catalysts of the revitalization that was already beginning to occur in
both neighborhoods.
In Oakland, the Housing Authority took the HOPE VI grant as an opportunity to leverage other
planning that had already been going on in West Oakland since the early 90s, following the
Loma Prieta earthquake. In many ways, the development of Mandela Gateway was the first
visible implementation of many plans for the removal of blight and incentives for more public
and private investment that had already been occurring. Westwood Gardens, the replaced public
housing, was a major part of the blight plaguing West Oakland. The Oakland Housing Authority
saw an opportunity to make the impact of Mandela Gateway greater by partnering with other
redevelopment initiatives that were happening in West Oakland. There was a mutual
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understanding between existing initiatives that without the revitalization (and subsequent poverty
deconcentration) at Westwood Gardens, many of the other redevelopment initiatives would not
have as much impact.
In Tucson, the neighborhood was already undergoing intense gentrification as property values
were rising and the supply of affordable housing was being threatened. Posadas was developed
in a way that preserved affordable housing in the broader neighborhood while managing to
leverage public and private investment that would serve the broader community while at the
same time reducing the isolation of the public housing that Posadas replaced. In using the
neighborhood-based dispersal method of poverty deconcentration, the Community Services
Department (Tucson's public housing authority) was able to create partnerships that addressed
neighborhood revitalization opportunities beyond the redevelopment of Connie Chambers.
In both cases, the method of poverty deconcentration at the HOPE VI development was
important because it was a critical factor in getting other funds to the table for public amenities
and mixed-income development.
2. Navigating the underlying economic and (re)development trends of the broader
neighborhood. In both cases, the strategies employed for poverty deconcentration were
developed and implemented in a way that harnessed existing market forces for neighborhood
revitalization in the HOPE VI project areas while improving the conditions of the former public
housing. In Oakland, this was done by rebuilding all of the replacement public housing units
onsite while adding in 122 units of affordable housing for low to moderate income families.
Affordable housing for very low income families was preserved, but the demand for more
affordable housing was captured also, onsite. In Tucson, the neighborhood surrounding Posadas
was already gentrifying. The neighborhood-based poverty deconcentration strategy served to re-
knit the fabric of the neighborhood by creating a more mixed income demographic at Posadas
that was reflective of the broader neighborhood, rather than the isolated concentration of very
low income households at the former Connie Chambers.
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In both Oakland and Tucson, the forces of gentrification were in tension with the crisis to
preserve affordable housing. In Oakland, the Housing Authority was one step ahead of the
market and leveraged community and political support to be the first entity to develop mixed-use
housing and retail in the area. Others have followed, but have had significantly more difficulty
in getting their projects up out of the ground. Why? Perhaps it is because private projects have
less access to political support and state and community subsidies than the HOPE VI
development.
In order to prevent the continued isolation of the public housing/affordable housing, the
respective housing authorities in both Oakland and Tucson had to balance these tensions in their
poverty deconcentration strategies in order to leverage the greatest amount of money and support
as leveraged from the original HOPE VI Grant. Beyond the element of the poverty
deconcentration method used at each site, the leveraging of HOPE VI money and resources
creates significant neighborhood revitalization benefits as public and private investors are
brought to the development table where both the housing authority and the investor benefit.
It could be concluded that Oakland and Tucson public housing authorities postured the poverty
deconcentration strategy in a way that enables more money to come to the table and thus,
broader neighborhood revitalization. At Posadas Sentinel in Tucson, for example, the culture of
public housing development policy in the city expected a one for one replacement and scattered
site placement of public housing residents. This really did occur, although it is less clear who
among the households receiving one of these scattered-site units actually lived in Connie
Chambers. The poverty deconcentration plan had to be culturally sensitive to that scattered-site
expectation while it minded the underlying forces of the neighborhood, as it was gentrifying. In
Oakland, the housing authority navigated the debate between preserving affordable housing
while increasing the income level on the HOPE VI site. In both cases, the housing authorities
navigated the underlying trends of the neighborhood while managing to preserve and produce
affordable housing.
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The Relevance to Other HOPE VI Cases in the U.S.:
The relevance of this thesis research is important to housing authorities as they begin to develop
their mandated HOPE VI poverty deconcentration strategies. What can be learned here and
replicated elsewhere is that HOPE VI poverty deconcentration is a very effective way for the
housing authority to position the HOPE VI revitalization in a continuum of underlying market
trends and other redevelopment activities that are already occurring in the broader neighborhood.
By creating a poverty deconcentration strategy that acknowledges these underlying trends, the
housing authority can be in a better position to garner funds and investment from other
redevelopment efforts occurring in the neighborhood while preserving housing for very low
income families. Despite the criticisms about relocation issues and difficulties in replacing
public housing units, the HOPE VI revitalization grant offers a large infusion of Federal funds to
leverage for greater neighborhood revitalization. The poverty deconcentration strategy, whether
neighborhood- or development-based, is one HOPE VI mandate that can be effectively designed
in a way that makes those with public or private funds to invest in the area more comfortable
with mixed-income development and thus more willing to invest in the broader neighborhood.
Remaining Questions: Further Research
1. Housing Authorities and Federal housing policy-makers need to better understand what
poverty deconcentration can mean for a neighborhood, on a neighborhood level. It is still
unclear how the implications of HOPE VI poverty deconcentration for broader
neighborhood revitalization should be measured.
2. How does poverty deconcentration help residents of formerly distressed public housing
go from being part of an island of poverty to being a participant in the broader
neighborhood economy? If these former residents are largely left out of the HOPE VI
development, are new concentrations of poverty forming elsewhere?
3. How is the role-modeling effect of households with higher annual incomes on households
with lower annual incomes understood and measured in HOPE VI developments?
4. Where is the place for "housing of last resort" if HOPE VI requirements demand that
poverty is deconcentrated and that the replacement public housing units are largely filled
by economically mobile, generally self-sufficient households?
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Appendix A:
HOPE VI Trends in the Continuum of Poverty Deconcentration Strategies
Discussion: The trends listed below are in reference to a review of poverty deconcentration
strategies associated with HOPE VI developments from FY 1997-FY2004. I chose these years
because they were the years listed on the HUD website "fact sheets." I reviewed each fact sheet
for all HOPE VI Revitalization Grants in this period and prepared a chart listing each project's
poverty deconcentration strategy. I did this research in an effort to place the poverty
deconcentration strategies of Posadas Sentinel and Mandela Gateway in a broader spectrum of
policy and practice. The two categories of poverty deconcentration used in this thesis are quite
prevalent in this spectrum.
After the Revitalization Grant:
1. There was a general reduction in total number of public housing units from the original
units to be demolished
2. There was a reduction of the number of public housing units onsite with an infusion of
higher incomes and more shallow levels of affordability
3. Public housing units were moved offsite either to another site with mixed incomes or
scattered among neighborhoods in single family homes or duplexes
4. Homeownership for public housing residents was mixed with traditional public housing
residents
5. Preservation of all original public housing units onsite with an infusion of market rate or
other average incomes and access to affordable units (as in Mandela Gateway)
6. Two sites with the number of public housing units split between the two
7. Lease to purchase options for public housing residents
8. Less total units, higher incomes onsite
9. The same amount of units onsite, but not as many units for public housing
10. Market rater renters and owners on the same site as public housing residents
11. Reduction in the total amount of units onsite coupled with the reduction of public housing
units onsite
12. Majority of public housing units offsite
13. Where there was no onsite redevelopment, there was significant reduction in the public
housing units
14. Reduction in total number of public housing units and increase in total number of units at
other levels of affordability
15. The number of original public housing units remained, but units for households at higher
incomes were added to the site
16. A reliance on the influences of mixed income housing and the influences of
homeownership tenure to affect the behaviors of public housing residents
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Appendix A (Continued):
Survey of HOPE VI Poverty Deconcentration Strategies from FY 1997-FY2004
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and
Individual Fact Sheets. Available at www
FY 1997
Development
Urban Development. Revitalization Grant Recipient
.hud.gov.
Notes
San Francisco, CA: Valencia Gardens 260 original units. After revitalization, all
units were replaced onsite and offsite.
Unsure of reduction or increase in public
housing units
Stamford, CT: Southfield Village Originally 502 units, after revitalization
370 units with 160 public housing units.
Washington, DC: Valley Green and Originally 403 units, after revitalization 48
Skytower community. public housing rental and 30 public
housing homeownership. All were
replaced onsite.
Orlando, FL: Orange Villa On and offsite components. 20 public
housing units onsite, 50 public housing
rental and homeownership offsite. Unclear
on whether there was a net loss of public
housing units.
St. Petersburg, FL: Jordan Park 446 original units, after revitalization there
was on and offsite mixing of incomes and
units. Unclear about net loss of public
housing units.
Tampa, FL: Ponce de Leon and College 1350 units originally, after revitalization
Hill onsite and offsite reduction of overall units
to 900. It is not clear how many of these
900 replacement units were preserved as
public housing. There was a mixing of
incomes both on and offsite.
Peoria, IL: Colonel John Warner Originally 321 units, after revitalization
203 onsite units including 153 public
housing units, plus 30 units of public
housing homeownership offsite.
Baltimore City, MD: Murphy Homes and Originally 793 units, after revitalization
Emerson Julian Gardens 260 onsite and offsite units. Unsure how
many public housing units remained after
the revitalization, but this strategy is about
infusion of higher incomes and scattering
1 of housing in the neighborhood (Like
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Posadas Sentinel).
Kansas City, MO: Heritage House After revitalization 56 public housing units
available. A new community was built for
tenants away from the downtown corridor.
Helena, MT: N/A
Elizabeth, NJ: Originally 655 public housing units, after
revitalization units were replaced both on
and off-site. It is not clear how many
public housing units remained, but the plan
was to scatter replacement units in the
surrounding neighborhood.
Jersey City, NJ: Curries Woods Originally 621 units, after revitalization all
Development units were replaced onsite and offsite with
a mix of incomes and a scattering of the
lower income units. Emphasis on
homeownership.
Patterson, NJ: Christopher Columbus Originally 498 units, after revitalization the
replacement units were replaced onsite and
offsite. A variety of incomes are served in
three separate, scattered developments.
Buffalo, NY: Lakeview Homes Originally 544 units, after revitalization
units were replaced onsite and offsite.
Unclear about mix of incomes.
Winston-Salem, NC: Kimberly Park All scattered site. Emphasis on
Terrace homeownership for public housing
residents.
Allegheny County, PA: McKee's Rocks Originally 288 units, after revitalization
Terrace 268 total units with 178 public housing
units onsite (20 homeownership units for
public housing families). There was an
overall removal of units and influx of
higher incomes.
Chester County, PA: Originally 192 units, 261 after
revitalization. Unclear about number of
public housing units after the revitalization.
Emphasis on influx of higher incomes and
homeownership.
PA: Schuylkill Falls Originally 266 units, 300 after
revitalization with a cross section of
incomes. Reduction of the density of
poverty onsite.
Knoxville, TN: College Homes Originally 320 units, 255 after
revitalization. Moved all public housing
residents to single-family homes in the
surrounding community.
Nashville, TN: Vine Hill Homes Originally 280 units. After revitalization
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Houston, TX: N/A
Richmond, VA: Blackwell Originally 440 scattered site units, after
revitalization 262 public housing onsite.
138 units public housing offsite.
Portsmouth, VA: Ida Barbour Originally 663 units, after revitalization
264 rental and homeownership units onsite.
Considerable reduction in public housing
units.
FY 1998
Development Notes
Los Angeles, CA: Aliso Village Originally 685 units, after revitalization
269 units of public housing onsite. There
was also an influx of higher income
households onsite.
Oakland, CA: Chestnut Court Originally 83 units, after revitalization 59
public housing units. Public housing units
were moved offsite and higher incomes
were added onsite.
Denver, CO: Cutis Park and Arapahoe Originally 286 public housing units. After
Courts revitalization 135 units of public housing
onsite.
Wilmington, DE: Eastlake Originally 267 units, 80 public housing
units after revitalization. Onsite only.
Higher income households were added to
the site and homeownership units.
Atlanta, GA: Carver Homes Originally 990 units, after revitalization
399 public housing units and 107
homeownership units for public housing
residents. Onsite replacement only.
Reduction of total units and an increase in
income ranges of residents.
Chicago, IL: ABLA Originally 2776 units, after revitalization
1052 public housing and units for higher
income households.
Lexington-Fayette, KY: Charlotte Court Originally 356 units, after revitalization
123 units of public housing and a mix of
other incomes. Units were replaced onsite.
Baltimore, MD: Flag House Courts Originally 487 units, after revitalization
140 public housing units with 27 lease-
purchase units. Units were replaced onsite.
This is an overall reduction of public
housing units onsite plus and influx of
higher incomes.
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there was a reduction of public housing
density onsite.
Charlotte, NC: Fairview Homes Originally 410 units, after revitalization
330 units replaced onsite and offsite.
Overall reduction of units, especially
public housing units.
Greensboro, NC: Morningside Homes Originally 380 units, after revitalization
286 public housing units onsite, with a mix
of other incomes. Overall reduction in
public housing units.
New Brunswick, NJ: New Brunswick Originally 246 public housing units, after
Homes revitalization units were replaced with 98
public housing rental units and 12 public
housing homeownership units. Overall,
less public housing onsite.
Albany, NY: Edwin Coming Homes Originally 292 units onsite replaced with
250 public housing units (50% onsite and
50% offsite) with other incomes.
New York City, NY: Prospect Plaza Originally 102 units, after revitalization 68
units of public housing offsite and 60 units
of public housing lease-purchase off site.
Overall the public housing was mostly
scattered.
Cincinnati, OH: Lincoln Court Originally 886 units, after revitalization
250 public housing units. Overall
reduction of total units and infusion of
higher incomes.
Tulsa, OK: Osage Hills Originally 388 units. Replaced with 388
public housing units and some other levels
of affordability and homeownership.
Chester, PA: McCaffery Village Originally 350 units. After revitalization
public housing was replaced offsite and
onsite with 174 public housing units (some
homeownership included). A strategy of
scattering and homeownership, without
introducing mixed incomes.
Philadelphia, PA: Martin Luther King Originally 537 units. After revitalization
Plaza 85 units of public housing were replaced
and the rest of the units were replaced with
a higher range of household incomes.
There was a reduction in overall units and
an introduction of varied levels of income.
Dallas, TX: Roseland Homes Originally 622 units. After revitalization
388 units of public housing were replaced
including some homeownership units plus
the infusion of units for households at
higher incomes. Overall number of units
was increased after revitalization, although
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public housing units were reduced.
Alexandria, VA: Samuel Madden Homes Originally 100 units. After revitalization,
100 units of public housing were replaced
plus over 150 units for households at other
income levels. Similar strategy to Mandela
Gateway in Oakland.
Roanoke, VA: Lincoln Terrace Originally 126 units. After revitalization,
34 lease-purchase units were available to
public housing residents and for
households at higher incomes. Overall,
most of the public housing was not
replaced; the public housing that was
replaced was developed into
homeownership units.
Seattle, WA: Roxbury Village Elderly, n/a
Milwaukee, WI: Parklawn Originally 518 units. After revitalization,
380 public housing units with
homeownership onsite and offsite. This
development was a reduction in the total
number of public housing units and
homeownership units were introduced to
the development.
FY 1999
Development Notes
Birmingham, AL: Metropolitan Gardens Originally 910 units. After revitalization,
two mixed income neighborhoods were
developed with 340 public housing units,
489 market rate rentals, and 200 units of
affordable homeownership (not particular
to public housing households). Significant
reduction of public housing units after
revitalization.
Oakland, CA: Westwood Gardens Originally 46 units. After revitalization, 46
public housing units were replaced while
122 rental units were added onsite (for
households up to 80% AMI).
Washington, DC: Frederick Douglas and Originally 448 units. After revitalization
Stanton Dwellings only 105 public housing units were
replaced. Units were added for households
at higher incomes.
Bradenton, FL: Rogers Garden Park and Originally 80 units. After revitalization, all
Rogers Addition public housing units were replaced plus
units were added onsite for higher income
households. Three-fourths of the units
were developed offsite.
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Lakeland, FL: Washington Park and Lake
Ridge Homes
Miami-Dade, FL: Scott Homes and Carver
Homes
Atlanta, GA: Joel Chandler Harris Homes
Decatur, IL: Longview Place
Gary, IN: Duneland Village
Originally 348 units. After revitalization,
239 units of public housing and other types
of units. 200 of these replacement units
were offsite. Overall increase in totally
units, an overall reduction in public
housing units with some units onsite and
offsite.
Originally 850 units. After revitalization
there were 80 units of public housing plus
an additional 135 units of rent to own
public housing. Plus about 250 other
affordable units onsite (available to
households at higher incomes).
Significantly less public housing overall.
Originally 510 units. After revitalization,
240 units of public housing were replaced
with 270 units for households at higher
incomes. Units were replaced onsite.
Significant drop in public housing units,
but total number of units remained nearly
the same level before and after the
revitalization.
Originally 386 units. After revitalization,
292 public housing units and about 150
homeownership units for other households
with higher incomes. Less overall public
housing.
Originally 163 units. After the
revitalization, 91 public housing units and
about 170 units for households at higher
incomes, including some homeownership
units. Less overall public housing units
units, but more total units.
Baltimore, MD: Broadway Homes Originally 429 units. After revitalization,
84 units of public housing with about 32
homeownership units. Significant drop in
total amount of units, and public housing
units.
Atlantic City, NJ: Shore Park/Shore Originally 214 units. After revitalization,
Terrace 190 public housing units were replaced and
410 homeownership units were built. An
overall slight reduction in public housing
units.
Newark, NJ: Stella Wright Homes Originally 1179 units. After revitalization,
304 units of public housing with about 500
units for households with higher incomes.
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Units were replaced onsite. Significantly
less public housing and influx of higher
incomes and homeownership units.
High Point, NC: Springfield Townhomes Originally 198 units. After revitalization,
35 units of public housing were replaced
and 150 units of were developed for
households with higher incomes including
some homeownership.
Raleigh, NC: Halifax Court Originally 318 units. After revitalization
340 new units, but only 200 of these
replacement units are public housing units.
Cincinnati, OH: Laurel Homes Originally 951 units. After revitalization
184 public housing units plus 350 units of
homeownership and other market rate and
affordable rental units (for households with
higher incomes). A significant reduction in
the amount of public housing units onsite
Dayton, OH: Edgewood Court, Metro Originally 213 units. After revitalization
Gardens, and Metro Annex there will be 110 units of public housing
and 130 units of affordable homeownership
units.
Columbia, SC: Saxon Homes Originally 400 units. After revitalization
93 public housing units, some
homeownership units and market rate
rentals. Overall, increased total number of
units, but there is a significant reduction in
the number of public housing units.
Greenville, SC: Woodland/Pearce Originally 348 units. After revitalization,
34 public housing units and 145 units at
other affordability levels. Overall, there is
a significant reduction in the number of
public housing units and the total number
of units at the development.
Nashville, TN: Preston Taylor Homes 550 distressed public housing units will be
replaced with 370 public housing units, 130
market rate rentals, and 100 units of
affordable homeownership. Overall, this is
a significant drop in the number of public
housing units.
Seattle, WA: Ranier Vista Garden Originally 468 units. After revitalization,
250 units of public housing with 730 units
of market homeownership, affordable
rentals, and affordable homeownership.
Overall, there are more total units, but less
public housing.
Wheeling, WV: Grandview Manor and Originally 328 units. After revitalization,
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Lincoln Homes 85 public housing units with 65
homeownership units. Overall, reduction
in total number of units and significant
reduction in public housing units.
FY 2000
Development Notes
Tucson, AZ: Robert F. Kennedy Homes Originally 80 public housing units. After
revitalization, 28 public housing units with
20 lease to purchase public housing units
and other scattered site units in the
neighborhood. Overall, significantly less
public housing units.
Oakland, CA: Coliseum Gardens Originally 178 units. After revitalization,
178 public housing units scattered in two
neighborhoods amongst other
affordabilities and homeownership units.
Richmond, CA: Easter Hill Originally 237 units. After revitalization,
191 public housing units, 46 public housing
ownership opportunities and other market
rate rentals and for sale homes. Onsite and
offsite components. Overall, the all public
housing units were preserved.
Washington, DC: East Capitol Dwellings Originally 1199 public housing units
and Capitol View Plaza onsite. After revitalization, 196 public
housing units mixed with units for
households at higher incomes. Also market
rate and affordable homeownership
opportunities were added. Overall, there
was a significant reduction in the number
of public housing units.
Savannah, GA: Garden Homes Estates and Originally 315 units. After revitalization,
Annex 111 public housing units with about 130
tax credit and other affordable/market rate
units. Also, 30 infill homeownership units.
Significantly less public housing units.
Chicago, IL: Ida B. Wells Extension, Originally 3200 units of public housing.
Clarence Darrow Homes, and Madden Park Now, 1333 total units with 273 public
Homes housing units and the rest at market rate
rental, and affordable homeownership.
Significant reduction in total number of
units and number of public housing units.
Newport, KY: Peter G. Noll, Booker T. Originally 202 units. After revitalization,
Washington, and McDermott-McLane 313 units were spread out in nine different
nei hborhoods with 150 public housin
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Biloxi, MI: Bayview Homes and Bayou
August
Camden, NJ: Westfield Acres
Durham, NC: Few Gardens
units, 67 affordable to higher incomes, and
96 market rate and homeownership units.
Originally 322 units. After revitalization,
150 units of public housing onsite with
affordable rentals and affordable
homeownership offsite. Overall, there was
in increase in the total number of units, two
separate neighborhoods, yet somewhat of a
decrease in public housing units.
Originally 511 units. After revitalization,
270 public housing units and other
affordable rentals and homeownership in
the neighborhood. Overall, a significant
reduction in traditional public housing
units.
Originally 240 units. After revitalization,
130 public housing units onsite and 35
homeownership units for public housing
residents. An additionally 260 units were
developed in adjacent neighborhoods, with
85 public housing rentals and 60 public
housing homeownership opportunities.
Overall, an actually increase in the number
of public housing units, but these units are
spread out over various neighborhoods and
mixed with other levels of affordability and
homeownership opportunities.
Mercer County, PA: Steel City Terrace Originally 100 units. After revitalization,
Extension 74 public housing units and 61 other units
onsite and elsewhere. Overall, less public
housing units.
Chattanooga, TN: McCallie Homes Originally, 416 units. After revitalization,
275 units are replaced, scattered site. Total
number of units does increase. Scattered
site and onsite. Including 275 units of
public housing.
Memphis, TN: Hurt Village Originally 450 public housing units. After
revitalization, 820 units were developed for
a total unit increase. After revitalization,
only 354 public housing units.
Danville, VA: Liberty View Originally 250 units. After revitalization,
total number of units onsite is reduced,
with just 35 homeownership public housing
opportunities.
Norfolk, VA: Roberts Village and Originally 767 units onsite. After
Bowling Green revitalization, 488 units onsite including
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288 public housing rentals and public
housing homeownership units. Offsite, 250
public housing rentals and 170
homeownership units for public housing
families. Overall increase in public
housing units.
Seattle, Washington: High Point Garden
Community
Tacoma, Washington: Salishan Housing
Development
Originally 750 units. After revitalization,
350 public housing units and significant
influx of other affordable and market rate
rental and homeownership units. Overall,
there was a significant reduction in the
number of public housing units, but an
increase if total number of all units.
Originally 815 units. After revitalization,
600 public housing units, market rate units
for rent and homeownership and senior
housing. Significant dip in the number of
public housing units.
Milwaukee, WI: Lapham Park Originally 170 units. After revitalization,
51 public housing units and 35
homeownership units. Total number of
units is reduced, and there is a reduction in
the number of replaced public housing
units.
FY 2001
Development Notes
Atlanta, GA: Capitol Homes Onsite increase of total units, units planned
for offsite, net loss of public housing units
from 694 originally to 497 units (including
rental and public housing homeownership
opportunities)
Boston, MA: Maverick Gardens Increase in public housing units from 413
to 509. Scattered between onsite
development and offsite development and
mixed with market rate units.
Bridgeton, NJ: Cohansey View Increase in public housing from 62 to 110
(including public housing homeownership).
Combination of units onsite and offsite,
though majority of units are offsite.
Chicago, IL: Robert Taylor Homes Significant reduction in number of public
housing units onsite from 1103 to 297. All
of the units will be onsite.
Chicago, IL: Rockwell Gardens Originally 572 public housing units,
1 replaced with 260 public housing rental
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units onsite and offsite with a mix of other
levels of affordability onsite.
Hagerstown, MD: Westview Homes 210 units demolished, replaced with 150
public housing rental units and 60
homeownership public housing units.
Mixture of onsite and offsite development
of public housing units
Jersey City, NJ: Lafayette Gardens Originally 492 units of public housing.
323 public housing units replaced with
rentals and ownership units. Mixture of
onsite and offsite development
King County, WA: Park Lake Homes 569 units originally, replaced with 300
public housing units, all onsite. There is a
net increase of units overall, but there is a
decrease of public housing units.
Macon, GA: Oglethorpe Homes Originally 188 units, 153 public housing
units after revitalization including
lease/purchase public housing units.
Onsite and offsite components
Charleston, SC: North Park Village Onsite and offsite components. 533 units
originally, 310 total ph. (lease or own)
units after revitalization
Philadelphia, PA: Mill Creek 496 units originally, 480 public housing
own or rent units replaced. Onsite and
offsite components.
Washington, DC: Arthur Capper and Onsite and offsite components. Originally
Carrollsburg 780 units to begin, 707 after revitalization.
Tampa, FL: Riverview Terrace and Tom Onsite and offsite components. 360 units
Dyer Homes originally. 261 after revitalization.
St. Louis, MO: Arthur Blumeyer 639 originally, 256 after revitalization.
Onsite and offsite components
Phoenix, AZ: Matthew Henson Homes 372 originally, all units are replaced, onsite
and offsite, some other incomes and market
rate are introduced to the development.
Portland, OR: Columbia Villa 478 units originally, 370 public housing
after revitalization. All onsite, but less net
public housing.
FY 2002
Development Notes
Daytona Beach, FL: Bethune Village and 399 units originally, 150 public housing
Halifax Park (homeownership and rental) after
revitalization. Onsite and offsite
components
Jacksonville, FL: Brentwood Park 594 originally, 225 after revitalization
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(including rental and homeownership). All
onsite deconcentration.
Fulton County, GA: Red Oak Townhomes 172 units originally. 100 public housing
units replaced on another site and mixed
with other incomes.
Denver, CO: 250 units originally. Increase in public
housing units, specifically to the elderly
population. Onsite and offsite components
Bradenton, FL: Mostly elderly, and not applicable to this
thesis.
Columbus, GA: George Foster Peabody Onsite and offsite components. 510 units
Apartments originally, now only 153 public housing
(rental and homeownership). Infusion of a
mix of incomes onsite with public housing
residents
Dallas, TX: Frazier Courts Onsite and offsite. 546 units originally.
After revitalization, 268 public housing
rental and homeownership. Onsite
development is infused with higher
incomes.
Duluth, MN: Harbor View Homes Onsite and offsite. All public housing is
replaced with rental or homeownership
units onsite or offsite.
East Baton Rouge, LA: East Boulevard and Mix of incomes onsite after revitalization.
Oklahoma Street Some offsite construction too. 171 public
housing units to begin with, after
revitalization, 96 rental and
homeownership public housing units.
Hartford, CT: Dutch Point Colony All onsite replacements. Originally 186
units. Now 120 homeownership and public
housing units available after revitalization.
Louisville, KY: Clarksdale Homes 417 public housing originally. 405 after
revitalization (rental and homeownership)
onsite and offsite components
Frederick, MD: Roger B. Taney Homes 146 units originally, 116 public housing
and homeownership resulting, onsite and
offsite.
Allegheny County, PA: Ohioview Acres 250 originally, 109 after revitalization
(rental and homeownership), onsite and
offsite
Akron, OH: Elizabeth Park Homes Offsite and onsite. 258 units originally.
106 + 13 homeownership public housing
units to finish)
New Haven, CT: Quinnipiac Terrace 256 originally, 160 after revitalization.
Onsite and offsite
Pleasantville, NJ: Woodland Terrace 104 originally, 75 + 13 lease to purchase
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units of public housing after revitalization.
Onsite and offsite.
Orlando, FL: Carver Court 212 units originally, 72 units after
revitalization. All public housing units on
the original site, although there is another
offsite development with a variety of
incomes.
Newport, RI: Tonomy Hill Originally 498 units. Public housing after
revitalization is 141. All replacements
made onsite.
Nashville, TN: Sam Levy Homes Originally 480 units. 181 public housing
units after revitalization. Onsite
replacement.
Minneapolis, MN: Heritage Park All offsite replacement. Originally 188
public housing units. After revitalization,
100 public housing units
Youngstown, OH: Westlake Terrace Onsite and offsite components. 289 public
housing originally, 74 public housing units
after revitalization.
Milwaukee, WI: Highland Park 276 units originally. Small offsite
homeownership component. 94 units of
public housing (including 40 units of
elderly specific) after revitalization.
Muncie, Indiana: Mucyana Homes All units replaced onsite. 279 original
public housing units. 62 after
revitalization.
Winston-Salem, NC: Happy Hill Gardens Originally 499 units. Onsite and offsite
replacements. Offsite component is all
homeownership. 149 public housing units
after revitalization.
Winnebago, County, IL: Champion Park Onsite and offsite replacements. Originally
75 units. After revitalization 42 units.
Utica, NY: Washington Courts 111 units originally. 70 public housing
units offsite after revitalization.
FY 2003
Development Notes
Louisville, KY: Clarksdale Originally 308 units. Replacement units
were onsite and offsite. Reduction in
overall public housing units, scattering of
units, and introduction of higher incomes to
the development.
Indianapolis, IN: Brokenburr Trails Originally 250 units. After revitalization,
58 units. The whole development got
smaller after revitalization and there was a
significant drop in public housing units.
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Fresno, CA: Yosemite Village Originally 80 units of public housing.
After revitalization, 15 units of public
housing and the rest at other levels of
affordability with particular emphasis on
homeownership.
Daytona Beach, FL: Martin Luther King Jr N/A
Cuyahoga, OH: Valleyview Homes Originally 243 units. Replaced with 95
units of public housing and units for
households at higher incomes for a total
development of 140 units. Overall
reduction of total units and introduction of
higher income levels.
Columbia, SC: Hendley Homes Originally 300 units. Replaced both onsite
and offsite. After revitalization, 66 public
housing units with units for other income
levels for a total of 133 units. Reduction in
total units and reduction in public housing
density.
Yonkers, NY: Mulford Gardens Originally 550 units. After revitalization,
327 public housing units with other
affordable units and homeownership on
four separate sites. Less total number of
units and significantly lower public
housing units.
Chester, PA: Chester Towers Originally 300 units. After revitalization,
156 public housing units with other
affordability levels introduced onsite.
Reduction in public housing units and
reduction in total units in introduction of
higher incomes to the development.
Charlotte, NC: Piedmont Courts Originally 240 units. After revitalization
178 more units of public housing
introduced to the site. More public housing
units overall after revitalization (242) but
mixed in with a variety of incomes in a
variety of locations.
Camden, NJ: Franklin D. Roosevelt Manor Originally 288 units. After revitalization,
198 public housing units were replaced
with a many other units for households at
higher incomes. Overall, a reduction in the
number of public housing units but an
increase in total units.
Meridian, MS: Victory Village Originally 48 units. After revitalization
will be a 242 unit mixed-income
community with 113 units of public
housing and a variety of other affordability
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levels. Less public housing, but more units
overall, with higher income levels and
homeownership units.
Birmingham, AL: Tuxedo Court Originally 488 units. After revitalization,
only 110 public housing units mixed with
units for higher income households. Some
offsite homeownership. Less overall units
(total 331)
Benton Harbor, MI: Whitfield Originally 94 units. After revitalization, all
public housing units were replaced and
other affordable rental units and
homeownership units were added onsite
and offsite. Similar to Oakland's Mandela
Gateway.
Nashville, TN: John Henry Hale Homes Originally, 498 units. After revitalization,
188 public housing on two sites. 288 units
total number of units after the
revitalization. Overall reduction in public
housing and reduction in total number of
units.
Washington, DC: Eastgate Gardens Originally 230 units. After revitalization,
61 units of public housing and housing at a
variety of other incomes. Units replaced
onsite. Slight reduction in overall units,
significant reduction in the amount of
public housing units.
Stamford, CT: Fairfield Court Originally 144 units. Replaced with 60
public housing units and infused with other
rental units and homeownership
opportunities for a variety of incomes. An
increase in overall units, but a significant
reduction in the amount of public housing.
St. Louis, MO: Cochran Gardens Originally 289 units of housing. After the
revitalization, 86 units of public housing
with a mix of other affordable, market and
homeownership units. Decrease in total
units and a significant reduction in public
housing units.
Spartanburg, SC: Phyllis Goins Originally 184 units. 110 public housing
units after revitalization. Replaced onsite
and offsite. More total units after
revitalization (336), but a significant
shortage of traditional public housing units
from the beginning.
Raleigh, NC: Chavis Heights Originally 296 units. After revitalization,
127 units of public housing plus an
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infusion of other incomes and affordability.
Total units onsite and offsite are lower and
the number of total public housing units is
significantly lower.
New Orleans, LA: William J. Fisher Originally 180 units. No traditional public
Homes housing was rebuilt. 98 homeownership
units for public housing residents were
rebuilt. Plus market rate homeownership.
Total public housing units is reduced
significantly.
Mobile, AL: Thomas Homes Originally 787 units. After revitalization,
175 public housing units. Units replaced
onsite and offsite. Significant reduction in
units (total 306) and significant reduction
in public housing units.
Tucson, AZ: Martin Luther King Originally 96 units. Part of the City's
Apartments larger revitalization plan, the 96 units were
all replaced. Increase in total affordable
units and preservation of all of the public
housing units, onsite and offsite
components.
Milwaukee, WI: N/A
Memphis, TN: Lamar Terrace Originally 478 units of public housing.
After revitalization, 152 public housing
units. Onsite and offsite replacement.
Reduction of total number of units (270)
and significant reduction of public housing
units.
FY 2004
Development Notes
Springfield, OH: Lincoln Park Originally 210 units. After revitalization,
108 public housing replaced onsite.
Overall, less public housing units and the
introduction of higher incomes onsite.
Allentown, PA: Hanover Acres and Originally 421 units of public housing.
Riverview Terrace 200 public housing units replaced onsite
and offsite. After revitalization, less overall
units and much less public housing units.
El Paso, TX: Alamito Apartments Originally 349 units. Replaced on and
offsite. After revitalization, 256 public
housing units replaced and mixed with
units for households at higher incomes.
Some homeownership.
Greenville, SC: Jesse Jackson Townhomes Originally 340 units. 187 public housing
units replaced onsite and offsite with units
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for households at higher incomes at both
sites. Overall reduction of public housing
units.
Philadelphia, PA: N/A
Tuscaloosa, AL: McKenzie Courts Originally 340 units. After revitalization,
234 units of public housing and 28
homeownership opportunities for public
housing families. Overall reduction in
public housing units onsite with some
homeownership opportunities
Appendix B:
City of Tucson Public Housing Unit List
April 17, 2006
Source: City of Tucson, Community Services Department, Housing Management Division
Adapted by: Carrie Vanderford, April 2006
Housing Type # of Units
Family, Scattered 60
Family, Scattered 60
Martin Luther King Apartments, 96
Elderly/Disabled High Rise (3rd HOPE VI)
Family, Scattered (Kennedy Homes Replacement Units, South Park HOPE 28
VI Tax Credits)
Craycroft Towers, 74
Elderly/Disabled High Rise
Lander Garden, 20
Elderly/Disabled, Garden Apartments
Family, Scattered 105
Family Scattered 11
Lander Garden, 27
Elderly/Disabled, Garden Apartments
Family Scattered 25
Family Scattered 25
Family Scattered 25
Family Scattered 25
Family Scattered 25
Family Scattered 33
Family, Scattered 100
Family, Scattered 100
Family, Scattered 25
Tucson House, 406
Elderly/Disabled High Rise
(Tax Credit, Public Housing)
Family, Scattered 22
(Connie Chambers Replacement Units)
Family Scattered 80
(Connie Chambers Replacement Units - Tax Credit)
Posadas Sentinel 38
(Connie Chambers Replacement Units - Tax Credits)
Posadas Sentinel 22
(Connie Chambers Replacement Units - Tax Credits)
Family, Scattered (Connie Chambers Replacement Units) 21
Family Scattered (Kennedy Homes Replacement Units) 52
TOTAL Scattered Site Family 882
TOTAL Elderly/Disabled (High Rise and Garden Style) 623
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Appendix C:
Greater Santa Rosa Area Land Use
1970-1990
Tuuon Urban Ar*
EXISTING LARD USE
1971
RESIDENTIAL BUSINESS [NDUSTRIALGuest Ranch 4""Extractive
M I RY AGRICULTURAL
SCALE N MILES
'~ ~ ~ ,(MI+ + H I III ill
1990 LAND USE MAP
Tuonn Melrpoen Am
LEGEND
Attached Housing
* Afi.h.d H ..ir
Mobile Home.
Commercil
* Public &nftula
Parke Open Spac.
Drainage
Agricoulture
() Vacant
From 1970 to 1990 the
Posadas Sentinel Study
area became more
commercial in nature.
Source: City of Tucson Planning
Department
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Appendix D:
Survey and Data Points of Escalating Single Family Property in the Greater Santa Rosa Area
Data Points for Comparative Property Assessment
Source: Pima County, AZ Assessor's Office. 2006.
N
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Legend
Posadas Sentinel Study Area
streets
Assessment Data Points
[ Parcels
I randomly selected parcels containing single family residences in the Greater Santa
Rosa Area (see map for a visual description of these properties) and compared
property values of each property for years 1990, 1996, 2000, and 2006. I found that
there was a significant increase in home values between 1996 and 2000, often over
100% appreciation in value. There is some new construction the Greater Santa
Rosa Area, but most of this increase in prices indicates an extreme escalation in
home values in the last decade. Source: Pima County, Arizona Office of the
Assessor. The data was searched at: www.asr.co.pima.az.us.
Appendix D (Continued):
Between 1990-2000, the median home value increased in all census tracts surrounding Posadas
Sentinel.
Median Home Value -- Percent Change
from 1990-2000
per Census Tract
Map By: Carrie Vanderford, May 2006
Source: US Census
-- Posadas Sentinel Planning Area
Percent Change in Median Home Value from 1990-2000
717 60% - 100%
101% - 150%
151% - 213%
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Appendix E:
Median Home Sale Values 2004
Adapted from Social Compact, Inc. 2005 "West Oakland DRILLDOWN Market"
The map below indicates recent home sale values and prices in 2004. This information was
adapted from a recent (2005) study by Social Compact, Inc. in West Oakland. This map shows
that most of the single family homes near Mandela Gateway sold for $300,000-$499,000 each
with a median home value between $350,000-$450,000.
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Appendix F:
Median Home Sale Values Difference from Census 2000
Adapted from Social Compact, Inc. 2005 "West Oakland DRILLDOWN Market"
The map below indicates the difference in home sale values from Census 2000 to 2004. This
information was adapted from a recent (2005) study by Social Compact, Inc. in West Oakland.
Home values in the area closest to Mandela Gateway have increased between 100-149.9% since
2000.
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Appendix G:
Owner Occupied Buildings in 2004
Adapted from Social Compact, Inc. 2005 "West Oakland DRILLDOWN Market"
This map below indicates that between 40-55% of residential and commercial buildings are
owner occupied in the block groups that contain Mandela Gateway. In fact, most of West
Oakland is contains 40-55% owner-occupied buildings.
in 2004 By Census Block Group
M V
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Appendix H:
Interview List:
Posadas Sentinel, Tucson, Arizona
e Patricia Alvidrez, former resident of Connie Chambers Public Housing
* Adriana Cimetta, Assistant Program Director of Planning and Evaluation, University of
Arizona, co-authored the Final Evaluation Report for the Greater Santa Rosa HOPE VI
Project
e Joe Comella, Chief Architect, Community Services Department, City of Tucson
e Pedro Gonzales, former resident of Connie Cimnbers d Barrio Santa Rosa
neighborhood leader
e Voni Harris, Executive Director, Metropolitan Housing Corporation
e Bobbie Hemphill, former resident of Connie Chambers and current resident of Posadas
Sentinel
e Michael Keith, President, Contemporary West Development
" Warren Michaels, Developer, Deep Freeze Development, LLC
e Emily Nottingham, Director, Community Services Department, City of Tucson, Arizona
* Olga Osterhage, Project Manager, Community Services Department, City of Tucson
* Michelle Pierson, former Economic Development Director, City of Tucson
e Corky Poster, professor, University of Arizona; Principal, Poster Frost Associates, Inc.
Lead Architect and Planner for Posadas Sentinel
e Melissa Shaff, Family Self-Sufficiency Coordinator, Community Services Department,
City of Tucson
" Tom Wuelpern, President and CEO, Rammed Earth Development
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Appendix I:
Interview List:
Mandela Gateway, Oakland, California
e Philip Banta, Principal Architect, Philip Banta and Associates Architecture
" Bruce Beasley, West Oakland-based Artist and Sculptor
" Melissa Buss, Project Coordinator, Aegis Realty Partners
" Nick Echelbarger, Project Manager, Peter Sullivan Properties, Inc.
" Stephanie Forbes, Executive Director, Bay Area LISC
" Bridget Galka, Development Department, Oakland Housing Authority
* Jabari Herbert, Executive Director, Alliance for West Oakland Development
" Patricia Ison, Director of Resident Services, Oakland Housing Authority
" Gloria King, West Oakland Project Manager, City of Oakland
" Margo Prado, Economic Development Department, City of Oakland
" Jeffrey Levin, Housing Policy and Programs, City of Oakland
" Steve Lowe, President, West Oakland Commercial Association
* Nancy Nadel, City Councilperson, 3rd District, City of Oakland
" Bob MacPherson, Division Chief for Right-of-Way, California Department of
Transportation
* Marsha Murrington, Vice-President of Programs, Unity Council
* Phil Neville, Director of Development, Oakland Housing Authority
* Victor Rubin, Director of Research, PolicyLink
* Shall Smalls, Development Department, Oakland Housing Authority
* Marge Stanzione, Planner IV, City of Oakland
e Jesse Wu, Project Director, BRIDGE Housing Corporation
137
Bibliography:
Brophy, Paul and Rhonda Smith. 1997. Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success.
Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 3 (2): 3-31.
Canyon Research Southwest, Inc. 2002. Marketability Analysis Redevelopment Opportunities
South Stone/6' Avenue Corridor, Tucson Arizona. Prepared for City of Tucson,
Community Services Department.
Cimetta, Adriana and Ralph Renger. 2002. Final Report for the Greater Santa Rosa HOPE VI
Project Year Ending 2002. Tucson: The University of Arizona College of Public Health.
City of Tucson, Community Services Department. 1996. HOPE VI Revitalization Grant.
Tucson: Community Services Department.
City of Tucson. 2006. Draft Housing Authority Deconcentration Policy. Tucson, AZ:
Community Services Department.
Devin, Dave. 2002. Barrio Viejo, Barrio Nuevo. Tucson Weekly. May 23, 2002
Downs, Anthony. 1981. Neighborhoods and Urban Development. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Goetz, Edward. 2003. Clearing the Way: Deconcentrating the Poor in Urban America.
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
Goetz, Edward. 2003. Housing Dispersal Programs. Journal ofPlanning Literature 18(1): 3-16.
Hood Design, et al. 2004. Seventh Street Concept and Urban Design Plan. Oakland:
CEDA.
Housing Authority of the City of Oakland, California. Mandela Gateway: Application to
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for the Revitalization of
Westwood Gardens under the HOPE VI Program. May 27, 1999. To: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
HUD. 1996c. Notice of Funding Availability for Public Housing Demolition, Site Revitalization,
and Replacement Housing Grants (HOPE VI), Fiscal Year 1996. Federal Register
61(141):38,024, July 22.
Jargowsky, Paul A. 1997. Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kelly, Regina, ed. 2000. Don 't Look at Me Different: Voicesfrom the Projects. Tucson: Tucson
Voices Press.
138
Krumholz, Norman and Dennis Keating, editors. 1999. Rebuilding Urban Neighborhoods
:Achievements, Opportunities, and Limits. Thousand Oaks, Calif.:Sage
Publications.
Khadduri, Jill. 2001. Deconcentration: What do we mean? What do we want? Cityscape: A
Journal of Policy and Development Research 5(2).
Mandela Gateway Gardens Associates. 2001. Response to Requestfor Qualification:
Westwood HOPE VI Development. Oakland, California: Oakland Housing
Authority. August 14, 2001.
Mandela Parkway Corridor Plan: A Vision and Strategy Plan for the Former Cypress
Freeway Corridor. 1997. Oakland: CEDA. .
Mandela Parkway Corridor Plan: Landscape Guidelines for the Former Cypress Freeway
Corridor. 1998. Oakland: CEDA.
Massey, Douglas and Nancy Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Michael Willis Architects, et al. 2001. West Oakland Transit Village Action Report. 2001.
Oakland: CalTrans. .
Mundie & Associates. 2005. The Proposed Wood Street Project: Policy and Planning
Framework. A Report to the City of Oakland Community and Economic Development
Agency Planning Division. Oakland: CEDA.
NCSDPH (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing). 1992. The
Final Report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing:
A Report to the Congress and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Popkin, Susan J., Larry F. Furron, Diane K. Levy and Mary K. Cunningham. 2000. The
Gautreaux Legacy: What Might Mixed-Income and Dispersal Strategies Mean for the
Poorest Public Housing Tenants? Housing Policy Debate 11(4).
Popkin, Susan J., Bruce Katz, Mary K. Cunningham, Karen D. Brown, Jeremy Gustafson, and
Margery A. Turner. 2004. A Decade of HOPE VI: Research Findings and Policy
Challenges. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.
Poster, Corky. 1994. Comprehensive Community Development Plan for the Greater Santa
Rosa Area. Tucson: The Drachman Institute for Land and Regional Development
Studies.
Praetzellis, Mary and Adrian Praetzellis, eds. 2004. Putting the "There " There: Historical
Archeologies of West Oakland 1-880 Cypress Freeway ReplacementProject.
139
Oakland, CA: Anthropological Studies Center Sonoma State University for the California
Department of Transportation.
Redevelopment Agency of the City of Oakland. 2003. Redevelopment Planfor the West Oakland
Redevelopment Project. Oakland: Redevelopment Agency of the City of Oakland.
Renger, Ralph, Omar Passons and Adriana Cimetta. 2003. Evaluating Housing Revitalization
Projects: Critical Lessons for all Evaluators. American Journal ofEvaluation 24(1).
Rosenbaum, James E., Linda K. Stroh and Cathy A. Flynn. 1999. Lake Parc Place: A Study
of Mixed-Income Housing. Housing Policy Debate 10 (1).
Salama, J.J. 1999. The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing: Early Results from HOPE
VI Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Antonio. Housing Policy Debate 10 (1).
Schwartz, Alex, and Kian Tajbakhsh. 1997. Mixed-Income Housing: Unanswered
Questions. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research 3(2): 71-92.
Smith, Alistair. 2002. Mixed Income Housing Developments: Promise and Reality.
Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University.
Turbov, Mindy and Valerie Piper. 2005. HOPE VI and Mixed-Finance Redevelopments: A
Catalyst for Neighborhood Renewal. Washington, DC: Brookings.
Van Meter Williams Pollock. 1998. Acorn Prescott Neighborhood Transportation Plan.
Oakland, CA: Community and Economic Development Agency.
Volante, Eric. 2001. The Modem Barrio: New Digs for Connie Chambers Residents.
Arizona Daily Star. March 22, 2001.
Whiteley, Peter 0. 2006. Best new city neighborhood: Barrio Santa Rosa. Sunset Magazine.
February 2006.
Wilson, William J. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and
Public Policy. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Zhang, Yan. 2004. Wills and Ways: Policy Dynamics of HOPE VIfrom 1992 to 2002.
Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Zielenbach, Sean. 2002. The Economic Impact of HOPE VI on Neighborhoods. Washington,
D.C.: Housing Research Foundation.
140
